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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOCAL IN  
IMMIGRATION REGULATION 
Cristina M. Rodríguez* 
The proliferation of state and local regulation designed to control 
immigrant movement generated considerable media attention and 
high-profile lawsuits in 2006 and 2007. Proponents and opponents 
of these measures share one basic assumption, with deep roots in 
constitutional doctrine and political rhetoric: immigration control 
is the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. Because of 
the persistence of this assumption, assessments of this important 
trend have failed to explain why state and local measures are aris-
ing in large numbers, and why the regulatory uniformity both sides 
claim to seek is neither achievable nor desirable.  
I argue that the time has come to devise a modus vivendi regarding 
participation by all levels of government in the management of mi-
gration. To do so, I provide a functional account of subfederal 
immigration regulation and demonstrate how the federal-state-local 
dynamic operates as an integrated system to manage contemporary 
immigration. The primary function of states and localities is to in-
tegrate immigrants into the body politic and thus to bring the 
country to terms with demographic change. This process cannot be 
managed by a single sovereign, and it sometimes depends on states 
and localities adopting positions in tension with federal policy.  
Given these dynamics, I offer a reformulation of existing federalism 
presumptions in the immigration context. These will not be primar-
ily for application by courts, though courts should abandon 
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constitutional or strong field and obstacle preemption theories in 
immigration cases. Instead, I offer a framework for federal and 
state lawmakers intended to restrain their impulses to preempt leg-
islation by lower levels of government and to create incentives for 
cooperative ventures in immigration regulation.  
Counterintuitively, the changes wrought by international economic 
integration demand strong institutions beneath the national level. 
Immigration highlights this convergence of the transnational and 
the local. Only by assimilating our understandings of immigration 
federalism to this realization can we explain and harness the value 
of state and local regulation. 
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Introduction 
The processes of global integration are changing how governments do 
business. Nowhere is this change more apparent than in the mechanisms 
lawmakers at every level of government are employing to respond to the 
ways in which immigration is reshaping American society.1 Among the most 
notable regulatory trends of recent years is the rise of state and local efforts 
designed to control immigrant movement, define immigrant access to gov-
ernment, and regulate the practices of those with whom immigrants 
associate in the private sphere, namely employers and landlords. In the first 
six months of 2007 alone, more than 1400 bills addressing immigration and 
immigrants in some capacity were introduced in state legislatures across the 
country, and nearly 200 of those bills became law.2 The so-called “Illegal 
Immigrant Relief Acts” (“IIRAs”), passed by small towns across the country 
and made famous by Hazleton, Pennsylvania,3 have generated particular 
media scrutiny and given rise to high-profile lawsuits, two of which have 
resulted in the invalidation of ordinances that would regulate employers and 
landlords in their dealings with unauthorized immigrants.4 
States have always been active in immigration regulation, of course. In 
the early republic, state inspection laws and the imposition of duties on mi-
grants’ entrance functioned as immigration law.5 In the twentieth century, 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Since 1990, more immigrants have entered the United States than at any other point in 
the nation’s history. For a representative sample of the literature documenting this trend, see  
Richard Alba & Victor Nee, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Con-
temporary Immigration (2003), and Mary C. Waters & Tomás R. Jiménez, Assessing Immigrant 
Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges, 31 Ann. Rev. Soc. 105 (2005).  
 2. For an account of measures passed in 2007, see Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 
2007 Enacted State Legislation Related to Immigrants and Immigration, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
programs/immig/2007ImmigrationUpdate.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007). 
 3. The Fair Immigration Reform Movement has compiled a representative list of local 
ordinances considered since the movement began in San Bernardino, California, whose City  
Council ultimately rejected an ordinance intended to crack down on unauthorized migration.  
See Overview of Recent Ordinances on Immigration, Fair Immigration Reform Movement  
(2006), available at http://immigrantsolidarity.org/Documents/Nov06OverviewLocalOrdinances/ 
OverviewofRecentLocalImmigrationOrdinancesandResolutions.pdf. As of September 2007, at least 
eight lawsuits against these ordinances were active around the country.  
 4. Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (striking down a local ordi-
nance on preemption grounds); Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
12, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_opinion.pdf (holding that a 
city ordinance imposed penalties not authorized by state law, including a Missouri state law that 
prohibited landlords from evicting tenants without at least thirty days notice and required landlords 
to use “judicial process”). 
 5. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (invalidating New York and 
Massachusetts laws that imposed landing fees on alien passengers to pay for support of foreign 
paupers); Mayor of the City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding a New 
York state law requiring masters of vessels arriving in New York from another country or state to 
provide a detailed list of every passenger on board, to post security for maintenance of immigrants 
who became wards of city, and to remove any noncitizen deemed likely to become a ward, on 
grounds that it constituted police power regulation, not regulation of interstate commerce). For a 
discussion of state practice in the nineteenth century, see Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the 
Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law 23 (1996), which notes that 
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states made occasional attempts to crackdown on employers who hired un-
authorized workers6 and restricted immigrant access to public benefits.7 But, 
as this Article reveals, the trend in state and local immigration regulation in 
the twenty-first century has been dramatic, and Congress’s inability to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform in recent years likely means that states 
and localities will continue to be highly active in this area.  
These current trends, despite having historical antecedents, are in sig-
nificant tension with a doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in the late 
nineteenth century—that immigration control is the exclusive responsibility 
of the federal government, or that the Constitution assigns exclusive and 
nondevolvable power over immigration to the federal government. This ex-
clusivity principle has become deeply entrenched in constitutional and 
political rhetoric. Indeed, proponents and opponents of current state and 
local measures agree on one thing: the federal government should be man-
aging migration. Proponents of crackdown measures claim to be 
compensating for the federal government’s failures, and opponents excoriate 
state and local officials for exceeding the bounds of their regulatory author-
ity.  
With this Article, I set out to resolve this contradiction between rhetoric 
and reality by calling for a modus vivendi regarding immigration regulation 
by all levels of government. To achieve this working compromise, we must 
move beyond federalism debates as they are currently framed. Scholars who 
have addressed immigration federalism largely have focused on whether the 
national government or the states will be better at protecting or advancing 
immigrants’ interests—empirical claims on which the evidence is mixed.8 
                                                                                                                      
“[p]erhaps the most fundamental function of immigration law has been to impede the movement of 
the poor.” 
 6. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding California employer sanctions 
laws). 
 7. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1976) (striking down state laws restrict-
ing immigrant access to welfare benefits); LULAC v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Cal. 1997) 
(striking down California’s Proposition 187, which would have eliminated access for unauthorized 
immigrants to almost all public services, including public schooling). 
 8. Peter Spiro has done the most work developing a conception of immigration federalism. 
He has articulated a steam-valve theory, according to which states “desiring stricter enforcement of 
immigration laws could pursue that objective without imposing their preference on states in which 
immigration might be considered a neutral or positive factor,” which would “pose a net benefit for 
aliens as a group,” because it would be better “to be driven from a hostile California to a receptive 
New York than to be shut out of the United States altogether.” Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with 
Immigration Federalism, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1627, 1635–36 (1997). For other examples of these 
sorts of empirical claims regarding the benefits to immigrants of immigration federalism, see  
Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the 
States, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 357, 363–64 (2003), which notes that “we might just as plau-
sibly view federal authorization of divergent state policies as creating laboratories of generosity 
toward immigrants;” Peter H. Schuck, Some Federal-State Developments in Immigration Law, 58 
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 387, 389 (2002), which notes that, after 1996 welfare reforms, a race-to-
the-bottom did not occur; and Emilie Cooper, Note, Embedded Immigrant Exceptionalism: An Ex-
amination of California’s Proposition 187, the 1996 Welfare Reforms and the Anti-Immigrant 
Sentiment Expressed Therein, 18 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 345, 367 (2004), which underscores the impor-
tance of advancing immigrants’ welfare interests at the state level in light of successes in California, 
which were attributed to the state campaign’s “smaller scope” and “the ability of advocates to re-
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Missing from the discussion is a functional account that explains why state 
and local measures have arisen with increasing frequency over the past five 
to ten years, and how this reality on the ground should reshape our concep-
tual and doctrinal understandings of immigration regulation.  
In the pages that follow, I provide that missing functional account. I ar-
gue that the federal government, the states, and localities form part of an 
integrated regulatory structure that helps the country as a whole to absorb 
immigration flows and manage the social and cultural change that immigra-
tion inevitably engenders. The primary function states and localities play in 
this structure is to integrate immigrants, legal and illegal alike, into the body 
politic. By demonstrating how states play this role, I establish the simple 
proposition that immigration regulation should be included in the list of 
quintessentially state interests, such as education, crime control, and the 
regulation of health, safety, and welfare, not just because immigration af-
fects each of those interests, but also because managing immigrant 
movement is itself a state interest.  
The federal exclusivity principle, on its surface, is not inconsistent with 
the proposition that states help immigrants integrate, to be sure. But I dem-
onstrate that the integration challenge sometimes requires states and 
localities to take steps that resemble immigration controls.9 In fact, the proc-
ess of immigrant integration sometimes depends on entities like states and 
localities adopting positions in tension with federal immigration policy, par-
ticularly in relation to unlawful immigration. In other words, managing 
migration writ large depends on policy experimentation that sometimes pro-
duces contradictory results. The uniformity called for by actors on both 
sides of the debate is not only difficult to achieve, it is also often counter-
productive. Once we see state and local regulation in the perspective I 
provide, it becomes clear that the federal exclusivity principle obscures our 
structural need for federal, state, and local participation in immigration 
regulation.10 Today’s realities suggest different structural imperatives—
                                                                                                                      
spond to the unique political environment within the state.” For claims to the contrary, see Gerald L. 
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1425, 1436–37 (1995), which notes “[l]ocal anti-foreign 
movements may have difficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades, in part because 
emotions are not running so high in other states at the moment, and in part because aliens have some 
virtual representation in Washington by means of the foreign affairs establishment.” Cf. Michael J. 
Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and 
Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 493, 558 (2001) (“[H]istorical accounts of most restrictionist federal 
legislation do not reveal frustrated states seeking an outlet for their anti-immigrant bias. History 
simply does not support reliance on ‘steam valve federalism’ as a reason to celebrate the claimed 
new state freedom to discriminate against immigrants.”).  
 9. When states and localities act in their integrative capacity, they sometimes produce 
measures that affect immigrant movement and therefore resemble immigration controls. In some 
instances, state and local measures that facilitate immigrant integration will attract immigrants 
across national, state, and local borders. In other instances, state and local measures force immi-
grants from communities by making it impossible for immigrants to live and work there. 
 10. Cf. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Include the Legis-
lative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2007) (“[T]heories of preemption need to accept the truisms 
that the federal and state governments have largely overlapping jurisdictions, that each level of 
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namely the need for subfederal regulation. The persistence of the exclusivity 
principle, however, keeps the integrated system I bring into view from func-
tioning to its potential, precludes us from understanding how and why 
power over immigration should be shared, and prevents us from harnessing 
the value of the federal-state-local dynamic on immigration matters.11  
Of course, even if state and local participation in immigration regulation 
performs a valuable function, such participation could still be constitution-
ally preempted. But my account of current regulatory reality actually helps 
to undermine the federal exclusivity principle as a doctrinal matter. Federal 
exclusivity was neither a matter of original practice, nor is it specified in the 
Constitution. Rather, the concept of exclusive federal control over immigra-
tion emerged through Supreme Court doctrine for functional, structural 
reasons: the perceived need to have a single, strong sovereign manage for-
eign affairs. Even if those functional concerns were valid when declared, 
their foundations have eroded since, and federal exclusivity has become a 
formal doctrine without strong constitutional justification.  
Neither abandoning federal exclusivity nor accepting the integrated sys-
tem I describe means that the federal government should not exercise strong 
leadership on aspects of the immigration issue or that uniformity on some 
matters is not essential. Under a functional analysis, efficiency and coher-
ence require federal control over the formal admissions and removal 
processes. Strong federal leadership also may be necessary to prevent states 
and localities from imposing externalities on their neighbors that only the 
federal government can remedy.12 Though I will argue that the “sorting” 
produced by these policies has value, and that immigrants are distinct from 
other externalities,13 the federal government still may have an interest in pre-
venting these effects and may rightfully choose to displace state regulatory 
authority by operation of the Supremacy Clause. What is more, some state 
and local immigration-related activity may come into conflict with generally 
applicable federal (and state) civil rights laws and constitutional protections, 
                                                                                                                      
government is acutely aware of what the other is doing, and that each level regulates with an eye to 
how such regulation will affect the other.”). 
 11. Other scholars also have challenged federal exclusivity in recent work. See Peter H. Schuck, 
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 57 (calling for greater state involve-
ment in enforcement and in setting visa policy); Spiro, supra note 8; Peter J. Spiro, The States and 
Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. J. Int’l L. 121 (1994); Clare Huntington, The 
Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2008) (manu-
script at 5–6, on file with author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968716 (acknowledging that 
federal exclusivity is an “accurate description of immigration law” while challenging its constitutional 
basis). But see Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State Statutes and Local Ordinances: Preemp-
tion, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, in 12 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 901, 
904–05 (2007) (defending federal exclusivity for immigration because “[s]hifting immigration en-
forcement powers to sub-federal levels will more likely lead to weaker federal enforcement . . . .”); 
Wishnie, supra note 8, at 527–66 (arguing for federal exclusivity). 
 12. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1353, 1368–69 (2006) (“[S]tates can neither export costs onto their neighbors nor compromise 
the ability of other states to have a reasonable set of regulations.”). 
 13. See infra Section III.C. 
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including the Equal Protection Clause,14 the First Amendment,15 and land-
lord and tenant laws;16 I do not suggest relaxing these limitations.  
But the functional account I provide, in addition to undermining the arti-
cle of faith that state and local immigration regulation is constitutionally 
preempted, should occasion some shifts in the doctrine governing statutory 
preemption, primarily by leading courts to assess potential conflicts between 
federal and state law without giving extra weight to an overriding national 
interest in immigration regulation. Even more important, my functional ac-
count should give rise to new lawmaking norms, giving lawmakers 
incentives to engage in federal-state-local cooperation in the immigration 
field and restraining Congress from explicitly preempting much state and 
local legislation that may seem counter to federal objectives at first glance. 
What is more, my functional account should restrain Congress from over-
regulating with respect to integration issues, such as the rights and benefits 
states can accord immigrants within their jurisdictions. Finally, my account 
will help mediate the state-local relationship on immigration matters—a 
relationship clearly at stake in migration management but also undertheo-
rized. 
In addition to changing the terms of the immigration debate, the inte-
grated system I describe highlights several crucial features of federalism 
generally. It reveals the vital sorting function federalism performs—a func-
tion crucial to managing demographic change in a country as large and 
diverse as the United States. Relatedly, my account demonstrates how feder-
alism can help manage the effects of globalization and economic 
interdependence. My immigration story thus highlights that federalism 
serves as a crucial mechanism for shaping and managing national identity—
that the process of forging such identity is not a top-down, but a bottom-up 
process. In the end, the story I tell reveals why our understandings of the 
allocation of constitutional powers within the federal system must be re-
sponsive to facts on the ground, or to the arrangements that the various 
levels of government have devised to manage the challenges that cross their 
jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                      
 14. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s alienage jurisprudence, state laws that distinguish be-
tween citizens and noncitizens are subject to strict scrutiny. Scholars such as Linda Bosniak have 
shown, however, how alienage law sometimes collapses into the law of immigration control. See 
generally Linda Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (2006). Regardless, equal protection scru-
tiny is relaxed when state laws deal with unauthorized immigrants. The Court has only once found 
distinctions involving unauthorized immigrants unconstitutional. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982) (declining to treat the unauthorized as a suspect class but holding that a Texas state law au-
thorizing public schools to charge unauthorized children tuition violated the Equal Protection 
Clause). For further discussion of the difficulties in keeping these measures separate, see infra Sec-
tion III.B. 
 15. Several federal district court judges have struck down antisolicitation ordinances adopted 
by local governments to prevent day laborers, many of whom are unauthorized, from congregating. 
See, e.g., Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also infra Sec-
tion II.B.2.  
 16. See Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 06-CC-3802, slip op. at 3–4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 
12, 2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valleypark_opinion.pdf. 
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To develop my functional account, I divide this Article into three parts. 
First, I establish the disconnect between reality and rhetoric with respect to 
immigration federalism. In Part II, I take a close look at various forms of 
state and local immigration regulation to highlight the substance of the de 
facto integrated regime. I begin by looking at actual integration programs 
adopted by a few innovating states, but I focus as well on how different sov-
ereigns have dealt with the phenomenon of unauthorized migration, 
considering the IIRAs, as well as city sanctuary laws, state-level college 
tuition policies, and controversies over local day labor centers. In Part III, I 
consider how this functional account of state and local participation should 
affect our conceptions of the federal-state-local relationship, with an analy-
sis of the constitutional and statutory preemption doctrine that should result, 
as well as the shift in lawmakers’ attitudes we should pursue.  
I. The Exclusivity Lie 
Lawmakers today face three primary trends, each of which is contribut-
ing to the heightened lawmaking in the immigration area. First, since 1990, 
immigrants have been arriving in the United States in record numbers, pri-
marily from Asia and Latin America.17 Our country is in the midst of a 
demographic reordering similar in scope to the heavy Italian and Eastern 
European influx from 1890–1920.18 Second, the Pew Hispanic Center has 
estimated that, in 2006, approximately 11.5 million of these immigrants 
were unauthorized,19 and two-thirds of unauthorized migrants have entered 
the country in the last ten years20—factors that are contributing to the inten-
sity of current debate. Finally, the distribution of migrants today differs from 
that in the past. Migrants are bypassing traditional urban centers and gate-
way states,21 heading for destinations—namely the Southeast—whose past 
                                                                                                                      
17. Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, Right Moves? Immigration, Globalization, Utopia, and Dysto-
pia, in The New Immigration 13 (Marcelo Suárez-Orozco et al. eds., 2005) (citing Current 
Population Survey data from 2002). 
 18. Alba & Nee, supra note 1, at 9–10. Though immigrants at the turn of the twentieth 
century comprised a larger percentage of the total U.S. population than they do today, the absolute 
numbers of immigrants are at an all-time high. Sociological data suggest that immigrant communi-
ties are likely to be replenished for the foreseeable future, thus ensuring continuation of current 
debates. Waters & Jiménez, supra note 1, at 107 (“[O]ngoing replenishment of new immigrants . . . 
is likely to be a defining characteristic of American immigration for years to come.”). 
 19. Jeffrey S. Passel, Pew Hispanic Ctr., The Size and Characteristics of the Un-
authorized Migrant Population in the U.S. 1 (2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/ 
files/reports/61.pdf. Nearly seventy-eight percent of that population comes from Mexico or Latin 
America. Id. at ii. 
 20. Id. at 1.  
 21. Traditional gateway destinations include California, Texas, New York, Florida, New 
Jersey, and Illinois, and major American cities such as Los Angeles, Houston, New York, Miami, 
Chicago, and San Francisco. See Alba & Nee, supra note 1, at 8–9. Prior to 1995, three-quarters of 
immigrants to the United States remained in six states. Greg Anrig, Jr. & Tova Andrea Wang, Intro-
duction to Immigration’s New Frontiers: Experiences from the Emerging Gateway States 
1, 1 (Greg Anrig, Jr. & Tova Andrea Wong eds., 2006). Today, that percentage is down to two-thirds. 
Id. 
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exposure to immigration has been limited and whose experience coping 
with linguistic and cultural diversity is virtually nonexistent.22 
Both the sheer scope and novel distribution of immigration today com-
pound the extent to which immigration implicates the interests of localized 
political communities. State and local lawmakers are responding to this 
shifting demography by attempting to exert control over immigrant move-
ment. These efforts, however, collide with the conventional legal wisdom of 
exclusivity, thus setting up a relationship of antagonism among the different 
levels of government. In other words, regulatory reality and standard legal 
presumptions are not aligned. The first step in figuring out how to negotiate 
this contradiction is to see it in full.  
A. Conventional Wisdom 
The federal exclusivity principle is embodied in the Supreme Court’s 
strong statements that the “[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestiona-
bly exclusively a federal power,”23 and that exclusive federal control over 
immigration “has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and 
judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”24 This 
principle has been repeated and elaborated in countless federal court deci-
sions. In the order that ended litigation over California’s Proposition 187, 
for example, the trial court declared that “[t]he State is powerless to enact its 
own scheme to regulate immigration or to devise immigration regulations 
which run parallel to or purport to supplement the federal immigration 
laws.”25  
The continual judicial invocation of federal exclusivity, in turn, has en-
couraged the now-familiar rhetoric from state legislatures emphasizing that 
the federal government has failed to do its job controlling illegal immigra-
tion. Following the script laid out by the Supreme Court, state and local 
officials, who presumably consider their actions to be constitutional, none-
theless cite the failure of the federal government to enforce immigration 
controls as the justification for their legislative activity, simultaneously call-
ing on the federal government to perform its duties and stepping into what 
they have identified as the breach. As one member of Virginia’s House of 
                                                                                                                      
 22. Waters & Jiménez, supra note 1, at 105, 161; see also Marcelo Suárez-Orozco et. al., 
Cultural, Educational, and Legal Perspectives on Immigration: Implications for School Reform, in 
Law and School Reform: Six Strategies for Promoting Educational Equity 160, 162–63 
(Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999).  
 23. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).  
 24. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
 25. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F.Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. Cal. 
1995) (permanently enjoining most of Proposition 187). As Peter Spiro has noted, this injunction 
had the perverse effect of motivating the California Delegation to Congress to “federalize its prefer-
ences” and lobby for the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which 
funded immigration enforcement, dramatically expanded the grounds of removability, cut non-
citizens off from a range of public benefits, ended judicial review of a wide variety of agency 
decisions in the immigration context, and heightened penalties for immigration law violations. 
Spiro, supra note 8, at 1633–34.  
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Delegates put it while discussing the issue of in-state college tuition for un-
authorized immigrants, “ ‘[w]e feel like the federal government has not 
stepped up and accepted its responsibility for a federal issue . . . [which] is 
unfortunate because what you end up with are laws in one state that don’t 
conform to laws in other states.’ ”26  
The exclusivity doctrine also shapes the arguments made by defenders 
of immigrants’ rights, who argue that state and local officials regulating 
immigration are exceeding the limits of their powers because immigration 
regulation is a field wholly occupied by the federal government.27 As the 
plaintiffs in the current litigation over the Hazleton, Pennsylvania, ordi-
nances explain, “The regulation of immigration is constitutionally reserved 
to the federal government, such that even if Congress had not legislated on 
the same subject matter, the Ordinances would be invalid. State or local laws 
that encroach on this exclusive federal power can be described as ‘constitu-
tionally preempted.’ ”28 Parties at all points on the immigration policy 
spectrum thus echo the Supreme Court’s longstanding assumption that when 
it comes to immigration, the country should speak with one voice. 
B. Emergent Reality 
The federal exclusivity principle, in all of its legal and rhetorical permu-
tations, does not map well onto reality on the ground. State and local 
officials are reacting to our shifting demography in extraordinarily varied 
ways, particularly when it comes to how best to deal with the reality of un-
authorized immigration. Lawmakers have turned both to political and 
administrative processes to devise strategies for managing these trends. 
Whereas some actors have sought to abate immigration by assisting federal 
enforcement efforts and penalizing employers and landlords who associate 
with unlawful immigrants, others have decided to learn to live with the new 
demography. These lawmakers have taken bold steps to integrate even unau-
thorized immigrants, through policies such as issuing identification cards, 
making in-state college tuition available to unauthorized immigrants, declar-
ing cities to be sanctuaries from immigration enforcement, and setting up 
centers where day laborers can gather to find employment. In Part II, I ex-
plore the content of these measures. For now, it is simply important to take 
note of the breadth of activity and to venture an explanation for the de facto 
obsolescence of federal exclusivity. 
                                                                                                                      
 26. Elizabeth Redden, An In-State Tuition Debate, Inside Higher Educ., Feb. 28, 2007, 
http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/02/28/immigration (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (quoting Repub-
lican lawmaker John S. Reid). 
 27. E.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Hazleton’s Motion to 
Dismiss and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 32, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 
2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06cv1586), 2007 WL 856626.  
 28. Id.  
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1. The Global City and Its Shadow 
 Cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, like other 
“global cities”29 around the world, have a strong interest in recruiting and 
incorporating immigrants at both the high end and the low end of the labor 
market. These cities serve as international financial hubs and points of con-
vergence for transnational elites,30 and they also depend heavily on low-
skilled immigrant labor in sectors such as the hotel and restaurant industries 
and construction. As a result, global cities have become focal points for im-
migrant diasporas of various types and from around the world.31 All of these 
immigrants, who may lack power at the national level, have de facto power 
in the cities they constitute.32 The nation-state’s resulting “loss of monop-
oly” over the determination of rights33 has generated a need for new forms of 
power to be exercised beneath the national level.34 
Consequently, policymakers in urban settings often take stronger pro-
immigrant positions than do lawmakers at the national level. New York City 
mayor Michael Bloomberg, for example, has been a strong proponent of 
legalization programs and increasing the supply of immigrant visas. In the 
summer of 2006, Bloomberg emphasized in testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that immigration is inevitable and produces economic 
dynamism.35 He criticized proposals by the House of Representatives that 
would penalize localities for adopting sanctuary laws that limit the extent to 
which local public officials may cooperate in enforcing federal immigration 
law.36 
This pro-immigrant posture is re-enforced by the cosmopolitan character 
of places such as New York, Miami, and Los Angeles, which has resulted 
from their status as cities of the world rather than just cities of the United 
States. This cosmopolitanism is, in turn, compatible with a concept of citi-
zenship disassociated from thick forms of cultural identity, and it allows 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights 315 (2006).  
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33.  Yishai Blank, Spheres of Citizenship, 8 Theoretical Inquiries L. 411, 411–12 (2007). 
 34. See Sassen, supra note 29, at 314; Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Excep-
tionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 Yale L.J. 1564, 1564 
(2006) (“America’s federalist structure also serves as a path for the movement of international rights 
across borders.”).  
 35. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Examining the Need for a Guest Worker Program: 
Field Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Michael R. 
Bloomberg, Mayor, City of New York), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 
1983&wit_id=5493 (last visited Oct. 20, 2007) (“Although they broke the law by illegally crossing 
our borders or overstaying their visas, our City’s economy would be a shell of itself had they not, 
and it would collapse if they were deported.”). 
 36. See id. (“Members of the House of Representatives want to control the borders. . . . But 
believing that increasing border patrols alone will achieve that goal is either naïve and short-sighted, 
or cynical and duplicitous.”). For an extended discussion of the sanctuary law issue, see infra Sec-
tion II.B.3. 
RODRIGUEZ FINAL TYPE MR.DOC 1/7/2008 8:32 AM 
578 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:567 
 
residents of global cities to conceive of citizenship in broadly inclusive 
terms. It is at least plausible, for example, to imagine New York following 
the practice of Amsterdam and granting local citizenship, complete with 
voting rights, to foreign nationals who meet certain qualifications.37  
But the celebration of the global city as the site of new forms of partici-
pation for immigrants obscures, perhaps unwittingly, the spin-off effects of 
economic integration into the suburbs and beyond the major financial cen-
ters. The immigrants who are increasingly bypassing traditional gateway 
cities and states often have no apparent direct connection to the enterprises 
of the world’s financial capitals; the jobs they fill, as construction workers, 
meatpackers, and domestic workers, and the towns they populate, in subur-
ban areas and in the new immigration states, are far removed from the 
global city. But these jobs exist as the simultaneous result of integrated mar-
kets and of domestic labor shortages in the United States. These shortages 
reflect the increasing participation of U.S. workers in the service and infor-
mation economies, which also arises from changes wrought by 
globalization. In addition, large cities’ support of immigration, both legal 
and illegal, imposes costs on other localities by creating migration networks 
that do not correspond directly to economic demand and therefore result in 
geographic dispersal.38  
Without the cosmopolitan zeitgeist and deep immigrant history that 
characterizes the global cities, however, the new immigration destinations 
are not well equipped to adapt without friction to the cultural and environ-
mental changes this migration is producing. The interests of these localities 
differ markedly in kind from the interests of the global city, and the needs of 
the two locales are difficult to reconcile. Indeed, there is considerable evi-
dence that localities within states, when left to their own devices, converge 
on different strategies for managing migration.39 But to which interests 
should the national government, or a state government, for that matter, give 
preference?  
The accommodationist impulse does, of course, exist beyond the global 
city. New Haven, Connecticut, is at the experimental forefront, but with in-
                                                                                                                      
 37. Seyla Benhabib, Transformations of Citizenship: Dilemmas of the Nation 
State in the Era of Globalization 63 (2001); see also Richard T. Ford, City-States and Citizen-
ship, in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices 253, 226–27 (T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001) (discussing the city as a supplemental site of citizen-
ship because its cosmopolitanism and limited geographical scope promotes “identity and inspire[s] 
esprit de corps”). 
 38. Migrants may initially move in pursuit of economic opportunity, but because migrants 
create social networks, migration often outlasts economic necessity. Immigrants also do not neces-
sarily travel to the city or state with the most available jobs. Instead, they often follow the migrants 
who preceded them from their hometown. See Alejandro Portes & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Immi-
grant America 24 (2006). 
 39. E.g., Stephanie A. Bohon, Georgia’s Response to New Immigration, in Immigration’s 
New Frontiers, supra note 21, at 67, 69 (“The resultant policies are often quite different from 
county to county and city to city, with some localities working to make life easier for newcomers, 
while others seek to minimize potential disruptions by banning practices viewed as foreign.”).  
Connecticut also offers a case in point. See Jennifer Medina, New Haven Welcomes Immigrants, 
Legal or Not, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2007, at B1. 
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tentions exactly opposite those of Hazleton. The city recently adopted a mu-
nicipal identification card that is available to all New Haven residents, 
including the unauthorized, and helps unlawful immigrants access certain 
city and private sector services, thereby encouraging immigrants to trust 
public officials and helping immigrants live safe and healthy lives.40 Though 
the move has been met by derision from some corners, New Haven is serv-
ing as a model for larger cities like New York, whose city council is now 
considering such a measure.41 New York, it seems, shares New Haven’s in-
terest in reaping the public health and safety benefits of universal 
identification. In a similar vein, Cambridge, Massachusetts, has taken a po-
sition as a sanctuary city and regularly files home-rule petitions with the 
state on issues of immigrants’ rights, including seeking voting rights for 
noncitizens in local elections.42 The “shadow” of the global city thus in-
cludes people of diverse preferences, and sometimes gives rise to novel 
integration strategies.  
2. The Ambivalent State 
Given this divergence in preferences among localities, it is not surprising 
that state-level policies reflect ambivalence about immigration, underscoring 
that responses to high levels of immigration demand difficult negotiation 
that must be attuned to Americans’ very mixed feelings regarding immigra-
tion. A recently released study of five “new immigration” states reveals a 
similar pattern of adjustment in each location: states and localities initially 
approach the immigrant influx in an accommodationist manner, in some 
cases actively recruiting new immigrants.43 The willingness to accommodate 
eventually gives way to more restrictionist measures, such as denying immi-
grants access to public benefits.44 Today’s status quo in most of these states 
is ultimately characterized by ambivalence: legislators and administrators 
make regular efforts to reconcile the commitment to accommodation with 
the fear of existing residents that their communities are becoming unrecog-
nizable, and even dangerous.  
This cycle of acceptance, followed by restrictionism, culminating in am-
bivalence, is not an innovation of the new immigration states. Both 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See Caitlin Carpenter, New Haven opts to validate its illegal residents, Christian Sci. 
Monitor, July 17, 2007, at 2 (noting the adoption of a card to serve as identification for bank ser-
vices, municipal libraries, beaches, and parks, and as a debit card to pay for parking meters and for 
goods at certain shops). 
 41. N.Y. City Council Introduction No. 0602-2007 (N.Y. 2007), available at http://webdocs. 
nyccouncil.info/textfiles/Int%200602-2007.htm?CFID=1... (last visited Oct. 20, 2007); Nina  
Bernstein, Bill for New York City ID Card To Be Introduced by Councilman, N.Y. Times, July 24, 
2007, at B3 (noting that the bill was inspired by a “pioneering program” in New Haven). 
 42. Michael Castagna et al., Securing Non-Citizen Voting Rights: Determining the 
Feasibility of Enabling Legislation in Massachusetts 1–2 (2005), available at http:// 
ase.tufts.edu/uep/academics/field_project_reports/2005/4-securing_noncitizen_voting_rights.pdf. 
 43. See Anrig & Wang, supra note 21, at 2; see also infra notes 87–88 and accompanying 
text (discussing proposals by Governor Tom Vilsack of Iowa to recruit new immigrants to the state).  
 44. See Anrig & Wang, supra note 21, at 1–5. 
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traditional gateway states and the federal government cycle through these 
same stages, with measures like Proposition 187 and Congress’s 1996 im-
migration overhaul representing the peak of restriction. The examples of 
local ambivalence and resistance in the new immigration states simply high-
light that local players are making key decisions with respect to whether and 
how to integrate immigrants. Our social coping mechanisms are being de-
veloped by disaggregated entities or by state and local actors that sometimes 
(but not always) coordinate with one another. Eventually, states may reach 
equilibrium, accepting immigrants’ presence and choosing to adapt rather 
than resist, much as traditional gateway states arguably have done. 
3. Embracing Diversity 
One way to address the demographic pressures that have given rise to 
this spectrum of activity would be to call for strong federal intervention to 
obviate the need for state and local regulation. But placing all of our eggs in 
the federal basket would be misguided and counterproductive. The appear-
ance of state and local measures is not simply (or even primarily) a 
symptom of the federal government’s failure to reform the immigration sys-
tem. Instead, it reflects the unsuitability of a strictly federal response to 
immigration. The continued mobilization of the exclusivity principle dem-
onstrates that lawyers and legal scholars, who can be adept at devising new 
institutional forms to mediate certain aspects of transnational markets, have 
only just begun to discuss what Saskia Sassen identifies as the globalization 
processes that “take place deep inside territories and institutional domains 
that have largely been constructed in national terms.”45 
In the meantime, states and localities are addressing the question of how 
to handle the internal effects of globalization for themselves. Their activity 
suggests that though we may be able to identify a nationally optimal level of 
immigrant admissions, participation by national subentities in determining 
how best to sort and integrate these admissions is essential. This observation 
should be of particular interest to the immigrants’ rights advocates who 
readily invoke preemption principles. Much of the pro-immigrant activity I 
describe in Part II actually depends on a robust conception of local authority 
over immigration matters and on embracing diversity in regulations—
principles that are vulnerable in the face of a strong theory of preemption.46 
More important, the diversity of state and local regulation underscores how 
subfederal entities have developed their own particular interests in large-
scale, cross-border phenomena—interests our constitutional law doctrine 
should take into account. 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Sassen, supra note 29, at 3; see also Ford, supra note 37, at 209 (observing that global 
cities serve as magnets for immigration and international commerce and offer a rich vantage point 
from which to explore the interaction of disintegration and internationalization); cf. Bosniak, supra 
note 14, at 126–29 (emphasizing how the border crosses into U.S. territory through laws that differ-
entiate between the rights of citizens and noncitizens). 
 46. See infra Part III. 
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II. States and Localities as Agents of Integration 
I now turn to assess the substantive coping mechanisms various govern-
ments have adopted to respond to demographic developments, with a view 
to developing an understanding of the actual function state and local meas-
ures play in migration management. Existing scholarship on state and local 
regulation tends, understandably, to focus on the outcomes of local political 
processes, where populist and sometimes nativist reactions to immigration 
find their most vivid expression. But much less attention has been paid to 
what state and local officials, working through administrative processes and 
other mechanisms of governance, have produced. In this Part, I consider 
both forms of state and local decision making and demonstrate that the pri-
mary function state and local governments play is to facilitate the 
integration of immigrants into public life. As the discussion will reveal, this 
integration function coincides with, but does not completely overlap, the 
primary federal function of immigration control, or the setting of standards 
for admissions and removal.  
Prominent voices in the current immigration debate have called for 
greater national-level attention to integration issues.47 President Bush has 
convened a Task Force on New Americans,48 and in testimony to Congress, 
the Secretary of Commerce has offered up the standard lines about encour-
aging assimilation.49 A more thoughtful federal integration policy certainly 
would be a welcome development, particularly to the extent that it involves 
information sharing and performs coordination functions. But the impulse to 
federalize integration policy should be tempered with the recognition that 
state and local governments have been developing integration expertise, in-
cluding through strategies that involve direct substantive involvement in 
immigration regulation or control. After all, state and local officials are ei-
ther in control of or closest to the public structures most directly affected by 
immigrant presence: schools, civic associations, the workplace, and public 
health and safety institutions.  
It would be impossible in the scope of one Article to canvas the full 
range of recent state and local activity related to immigration. But I have 
chosen to make a first cut between policies that address legal immigrants 
and those that address illegal immigrants, though I recognize that reactions 
to legal and illegal immigrants cannot be separated completely and that re-
sponses to each type of immigrant often form part of integrated schemes. On 
the subject of legal immigration, I focus on programs adopted by various 
states and localities to integrate immigrants affirmatively into local institu-
                                                                                                                      
 47. See, e.g., Spencer Abraham et al., Migration Policy Inst., Immigration and 
America’s Future: A New Chapter xix—xx (2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
task_force/new_chapter_summary.pdf. 
 48. Exec. Order No. 13,404, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,593 (Jun. 7, 2006). 
 49. Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 144–48 (2007) (statement of Carlos M. Gutierrez, Sec’y, Dep’t. of Commerce of the 
U.S.) (emphasizing the importance of immigrants learning English and adapting to American cul-
ture). 
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tions and networks while helping existing populations adjust to the influx of 
newcomers. These programs are generally not in danger of being preempted, 
but their existence is relevant to the preemption question because it puts in 
perspective the relationship of states and localities to immigration.  
On the subject of illegal immigration, I first consider the most common 
restrictionist measures adopted of late and explain how they (counterintui-
tively) represent a necessary piece of integration policy. I then consider how 
states and localities have responded to unauthorized immigration through 
measures intended to promote those immigrants’ integration in some form 
or another—measures such as financing day-labor centers, adopting sanctu-
ary or noncooperation laws, and providing in-state tuition for unauthorized 
high school students. I acknowledge that the federal government has a role 
to play in the sorting process that demographic change requires. But I em-
phasize that it is important not to cut short the processes by which states 
learn to integrate immigrants by employing aggressive preemption strategies 
or by presuming that immigration and integration issues should be chan-
neled up to the national level.  
A. Integrating Lawful Immigrants 
Below, I focus on the integration strategies of three states that occupy 
different points on a spectrum of experience with integrating immigrants: 
Illinois, a state that has absorbed waves of immigration throughout its his-
tory and that has a self-conscious immigrant identity; North Carolina, one of 
the so-called “new immigration states,” with minimal post-colonial immi-
gration history but with the fastest-growing Latino population in the 
country; and Iowa, a state with a declining population that has considered 
turning to immigration as a possible means of invigorating its population. 
1. Illinois 
Governor Rod Blagojevich made headlines in December 2006 when he 
announced his intention to fund a multidimensional immigrant integration 
program via public–private partnerships in Illinois.50 This public commit-
ment followed from his “New Americans” Executive Order, issued in 
November of 2005, which (according to state documents) “create[d] a first-
in-the-nation coherent, strategic, and proactive state government approach to 
immigrant integration.”51 The Executive Order proclaimed the governor’s 
                                                                                                                      
 50. See, e.g., Kari Lydersen, Ill. Governor to Announce New Benefits for Immigrants, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 12, 2006, at All. 
 51. Ill. Coal. for Immigrant & Refugee Rights & Office of New Ams. Advocacy & 
Policy, For the Benefit of All: Strategic Recommendations to Enhance the State’s 
Role in the Integration of Immigrants in Illinois, Joint Summary, Year One Issues of 
Citizenship, Education, Human Services and Health Care 1 (2006). Governor Corzine of 
New Jersey recently issued a similar executive order, providing that “[t]he Advisory Panel shall 
develop recommendations on how the State can better prepare immigrants to become fully produc-
tive and self-sufficient members of society by addressing the need for greater access in the following 
areas: civil rights, citizenship status, education, employment/workforce training, fair housing, [and] 
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goal of identifying areas where the “[s]tate can strategically and cost-
effectively act to enhance immigrant integration and social cohesion” by 
complementing the integration efforts of families, faith institutions, and local 
community and service organizations.52 To this end, the Order created a new 
office within the governor’s office, which convened an inter-agency task force 
comprised of the state agencies that oversee health care, education, and hu-
man services. The governor endowed the task force with the mandate to make 
state services more accessible to immigrants. To complement this state-based 
planning process, the Order also convened the “New Americans Policy Coun-
cil,” a public–private partnership charged with developing recommendations 
for accelerating immigrant and refugee integration. 
In the December 2006 report that resulted from this process, the Policy 
Council framed the integration program as a matter of destiny as well as 
necessity. An Executive Summary begins by noting that the state’s growth 
has always been fueled by immigrants from around the world, and that suc-
cessive waves of immigrants have made Illinois a “great economic power.”53 
Today, of the state’s 12.4 million people, 1.7 million are foreign born, and 
1.5 million are the citizen children of the foreign born. As in the past, immi-
grant workers are fueling the growth of the state’s labor force; though they 
constitute 12.6% of the population, immigrants represent 17% of the state’s 
workers. They represent 27% of workers with doctorate degrees and 26% of 
low-skilled workers, confirming that the hourglass pattern of immigration 
identified by economists and demographers as a national phenomenon ob-
tains in Illinois.54  
The report then sets out a series of recommendations, some of which are 
quite ambitious and call upon Illinois residents to take their own steps to-
ward adapting to immigrants’ presence. Take, for instance, the report’s 
recommendations concerning linguistic adaptation, which represent a key 
component of the state’s integration plans. The required adaptation is bi-
directional, meaning that it requires immigrants, government, and the 
residents of Illinois each to adapt in different ways. Illinois thus has adopted 
an integration strategy different in kind from the approach taken by states 
and localities that have adopted English-only rules, which place the burden 
of linguistic adaptation exclusively on immigrants. 
On the one hand, the Policy Council recommends launching a well-
funded “We Want to Learn English Campaign.” The initiative would require 
dedicating resources to provide accessible and high-quality English lan-
guage instruction “centered in the communities and institutions where 
immigrants live and work.”55 It recognizes that state agencies, working with 
                                                                                                                      
healthcare . . . .” Exec. Order No. 78 (N.J. Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/ 
eojsc78.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).  
 52. Ill. Coal. for Immigrant & Refugee Rights & Office of New Ams. Advocacy & 
Policy, supra note 51, at 3. 
 53. Id. at 2. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 4. 
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local governments, are likely to be in the best position to identify such sites. 
The Council’s recommendations complement this service-provision ap-
proach with economic incentives that would tie advancement in certain 
areas of the service industry (such as hotels, restaurants, health care facili-
ties, and tourism) to immigrants’ participation in English-language 
instruction and vocational training programs.56 But in addition to calling for 
the implementation of these mechanisms for English-language acquisition, 
the Policy Council also recommends developing the capacity of state agen-
cies and state contractors to deliver adequate interpretation and translation 
services to ensure access to state-funded services.57 And on top of enlisting 
the state to ease the transition of immigrants into an English-speaking main-
stream, the Council recommends experimenting with dual-language pilot 
programs that would “encourage children of immigrants and refugees to 
retain their parents’ languages and develop fluency in non-English lan-
guages for other [non-immigrant] children.”58 Illinois is thus contemplating a 
model of linguistic adaptation that challenges directly a widespread public 
perception—reflected in congressional, state, and local debates—that the 
best way to ensure that immigrants learn English is to create an exclusively 
English-speaking public sphere and divorce the second generation from any 
meaningful connection to the languages of their parents.59 
2. North Carolina 
Unlike Illinois, North Carolina had a negligible immigrant population 
and a small population of Latinos before 1990.60 In 1970, 43,414 Latinos 
lived in North Carolina.61 But by 2000, that number had climbed to 383,465. 
And by 2004, the number was at 506,206—a 394% increase from 1990 lev-
els and a 1066% increase from 1970 levels.62 North Carolina has the fastest-
growing Latino population in the South today, due in large part to immigra-
                                                                                                                      
 56. The recommendations of the Inter-agency Task Force mirror these proposals. For exam-
ple, the Task Force recommends that state agencies develop “comprehensive linguistic and cultural 
competency training for state staff” that extends beyond “typical customer service to a service deliv-
ery system that is culturally and linguistically sensitive.” Id. at 6. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Id. I have discussed the democratic and experimental value of these dual-language pro-
grams at length elsewhere. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
687, 762–65 (2006). 
 59. As I have emphasized in previous work, programs that might work in Illinois, either 
because they cohere with the immigrant identity of much of the state, or because the state has come 
to accept the economic and cultural benefits of promoting integration, may not have legs elsewhere. 
See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1689, 1756 
(2006). 
 60. Paula D. McClain, North Carolina’s Response to Latino Immigrants and Immigration, in 
Immigration’s New Frontiers, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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tion.63 Latinos account for 7% of the state’s population, and they live in 
every North Carolina county.64 
The response by state and local officials to this phenomenon has been 
mixed. State and local agencies both have adopted a range of coping 
mechanisms that have included traditional immigrant benefits programs as 
well as innovative strategies designed to train agency officials to understand 
the Latino immigrant experience by exposing officials to aspects of the aes-
thetic and political cultures of the immigrants’ home societies. The Center 
for International Understanding at the University of North Carolina, for ex-
ample, has launched the “Latino Initiative,” which aims to assist public 
policy and civic leaders in North Carolina understand how best to meet the 
cultural challenges of the new immigration.65 The Initiative encourages poli-
cymakers and agency officials to understand the reasons for immigration to 
North Carolina and develops a network of interdisciplinary professionals 
who can act on that understanding to help immigrants integrate.66  
Among other projects, the Initiative sponsors trips to Mexico for state 
and local officials. These exchanges have been credited with changing at 
least one formerly restrictionist public official’s focus from a fixation on 
preventing illegal immigration to finding ways to help immigrants adjust to 
life in the United States.67 The Latino Initiative also has given rise to training 
programs for Mexican nurses and changed law enforcement’s strategy for 
interacting with immigrants, based on the recognition that Mexicans tend to 
have a general suspicion of police that stems from the pervasive corruption 
among Mexican law enforcement.68 The Initiative targets local communities 
in North Carolina and seeks to incorporate a range of public actors—
including law enforcement, state service providers, and local public school 
teachers—into the Initiative’s training programs. 
But as a recent study of integration initiatives in North Carolina reveals, 
the responses to immigration by legislative and executive officials have di-
verged, perhaps in part because legislators feel compelled to respond to 
decidedly mixed public opinion on this question.69 In her study of official 
                                                                                                                      
 63. See id. 
 64. Id. Shifts in the Southern labor economy have required large numbers of unskilled work-
ers to man plants in the poultry industry, as well as in meat processing, carpet manufacturing, oil 
refining, agriculture, and forestry. Id. at 9. These factors have been complemented by the “push” of 
an ongoing economic crisis in Mexico. Id. 
 65. For information on the Initiative, see UNC Charlotte, The Latino Initiative, 
http://www.provost.uncc.edu/LatinoInitiative/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 66. See id. 
 67. Ned Glascock, Mexico trip “humbling” for official: Leader in Chatham vows to aid 
newcomers, News & Observer (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 16, 2000, at A1. In 2000, Chatham County 
Commissioner Rick Givens wrote to the Immigration and Naturalization Service demanding better 
enforcement of immigration laws. After participating in the Latino Initiative, however, he expressed 
regret about his earlier position and declared “I’m man enough to admit when I’m wrong.” Id. 
 68. Media coverage of the Latino Institute has been mostly positive, though some critics 
have questioned the need to travel to Mexico to understand the immigrant experience when immi-
grants live in every county in North Carolina.  
 69. See McClain, supra note 60, at 14, 16–18. 
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responses to immigration in North Carolina, Paula McClain quotes an 
anonymous state official who notes this discrepancy: “The state has re-
sponded at different levels, at different speeds. More specifically, the 
response differs between the executive and legislative branches. The re-
sponse . . . to Latinos in the legislature has been a lot more combative. . . . 
The response at the executive has been more about helping Latinos navigate 
the system.”70 
Executive agencies, for example, have taken more concrete steps to ad-
dress challenges posed by large immigrant populations, including 
developing translation and interpretation capacity, particularly in health 
care.71 In 1998, Governor James B. Hunt issued an executive order creating a 
state Office of Hispanic/Latino Affairs along with an Advisory Council on 
Latino Affairs to coordinate and develop state and local programs to address 
issues of concern to the Latino community across a range of issues, includ-
ing education, health care, workers’ rights, licensing and documentation, 
political representation, and immigration. Though it is not clear whether this 
Council amounts to anything more than window dressing, the Council has 
issued some recommendations, again with an emphasis on improving the 
cultural literacy of public health professionals through training and ensuring 
health care service delivery through the creation of federally and state-
funded clinics for migrant farm workers.72 
The legislative response to immigration in North Carolina has been si-
multaneously more varied and more extensive in scope. Between 2001 and 
2004, lawmakers adopted a number of measures addressing the rise of im-
migrant children in schools. They allocated money for English classes that 
they had been reluctant to dedicate before; encouraged schools to hire bilin-
gual teachers and support staff, ensuring that schools would be able to 
communicate with non–English-speaking parents in the parents’ native lan-
guage; and adopted measures that would prevent notary publics and 
landlords from taking advantage of language barriers to exploit immi-
grants.73  
But as the debate over comprehensive immigration reform began to heat 
up, some lawmakers with an apparent eye to the national stage began intro-
ducing legislation intended to regulate unauthorized immigrants. These 
measures included a bill that would have authorized state and local law en-
forcement to enforce federal immigration law to the extent authorized by 
federal law, a bill that would have required proof of citizenship to vote and 
proof of legal residency or citizenship to obtain public benefits, and a bill 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Id. at 18 (quoting Interview by Victoria M. DeFrancesco Soto with anonymous North 
Carolina executive official (Feb. 27, 2006)). 
 71. Id. at 22–23. 
 72. See id. at 23. McClain’s account of the health care issue highlights how states and locali-
ties bear much of the cost of absorbing immigrants, and it makes clear that some local hospitals in 
North Carolina will find themselves facing something of a fiscal crisis in the near future if problems 
such as uncompensated (through Medicaid) care are not squarely addressed. Id. 
 73. Id. at 26. 
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that would have urged Congress to adopt English as the official language.74 
In addition, an effort to make in-state tuition available to non-legal residents 
of the state who had graduated from state high schools floundered in the 
face of strong public resistance. The more restrictionist measures have yet to 
pass, and legislators in North Carolina thus far have been restrained com-
pared to their counterparts in Georgia and Virginia, where some of the most 
extreme measures have been adopted.75 But with the collapse of immigration 
reform in Congress, North Carolina seems like fertile ground for more legis-
lation of this type. 
This divergence, both between the executive and legislative responses 
and the legislature’s posture in 2001–2004 as compared to 2005–2007, re-
flects the public’s ambivalence76 in North Carolina. In 1999, a survey on 
Hispanic newcomers to the state revealed that 42% of respondents “were 
uncomfortable with the increasing presence of Latinos,” and approximately 
55% of respondents were “uncomfortable being around people who did not 
speak English,” though fewer blacks than whites expressed such discom-
fort.77 An April 2006 survey produced similar responses: 63.7% of 
respondents felt too many immigrants lived in North Carolina, and 44.2% of 
respondents felt that Latino immigration has been bad for the state.78 These 
surveys thus suggest that a policy that is uniform across all issues, including 
enforcement, provision of services, and integration pilot programs in the 
vein of the nurses training initiative, is unlikely to address adequately the 
complex concerns that swirl around this issue. Permitting and even embrac-
ing conflicting responses may be a way to reconcile two inevitabilities: that 
immigration is likely to continue for the foreseeable future,79 and that ongo-
ing population shifts will produce complicated points of view. Importantly, 
the ability to experiment and to calibrate state initiatives with public opinion 
may require federal support, but it also requires freedom from federal inter-
ference—a consideration I explore in more detail in Part III. 
                                                                                                                      
 74. Id. at 28. 
 75. Georgia, for example, passed in 2006 “the most sweeping immigration reform bill ever 
passed by any state.” Stephanie A. Bohon, Georgia’s Response to New Immigration, in Immigra-
tion’s New Frontiers, supra note 21, at 67. Among other things, the law requires proof of 
citizenship to access state services and to vote. But see id. at 68 (“[I]t is difficult to disentangle 
which policy responses are prompted solely by immigration and which are reactions to challenges 
posed by the shifting population dynamics. . . . In the case of Latinos, they are often viewed suspi-
ciously as unauthorized immigrants, regardless of their actual legal status.”).  
 76. North Carolinians who are concerned about the impact of immigration express familiar 
reasons for their anxiety: perceptions that immigrants are taking jobs from Americans, causing 
crime, and overburdening public services. McClain, supra note 60, at 17. 
 77. See id. at 14 (citing James H. Johnson, Jr. et. al., A Profile of Hispanic Newcomers to 
North Carolina, 65 Popular Gov’t 2, 9 (1999)). 
 78. Id. at 16. 
 79. McClain notes that “[t]here are few signs that [Latino immigration into North Carolina] 
will let up.” Id. at 32. 
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3. Iowa 
Iowa as a case example offers yet another set of circumstances. Initially 
sparsely populated, Iowa grew in size in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries through the aggressive encouragement of mass migration, 
primarily of people from Northern Europe. As several studies have pointed 
out, Iowa today is again in need of a population revival.80 One recent study 
released by the University of Northern Iowa identifies the state’s “[n]eed for 
New Iowans,” which has resulted from an aging population, a declining 
workforce, and the fact that more people, particularly university graduates, 
are leaving than entering the state.81 The study thus calls for immigrant re-
cruitment to reenergize the state’s population, characterizing immigrants as 
productive, motivated, eager to work, and entrepreneurial.  
This call is essentially for an acceleration of existing trends. Though its 
numbers do not compare to North Carolina’s, Iowa has experienced an im-
migrant influx of sorts in recent years, primarily from Mexico, Africa, and 
the Balkans. As of 2000, approximately 97% of Iowa’s population was U.S.-
born,82 but the state’s population of immigrants in general83 and Latinos in 
particular has been on the rise since 1990, and Latinos now represent the 
state’s largest minority group.84 Indeed, the fact that Iowa’s population has 
remained relatively stable despite its rapid aging and the significant loss of 
young people is owed in large part to increased immigration to the state.85 
This infusion of immigrants is, in turn, leading to the diversification of set-
tings, such as workplaces and schools, that traditionally have been quite 
homogeneous.86  
In 1998, these two trends of declining native population and rising im-
migrant population gave rise to some extraordinarily bold integration policy 
proposals. Governor Tom Vilsack convened a Strategic Planning Council to 
draft an “Iowa 2010 Plan” that would lay out a policy course for the state 
across a range of issues. To address the state’s declining population, the 
Council’s Iowa 2010 report recommended recruiting and incorporating new 
                                                                                                                      
 80. E.g., Mark A. Grey, State and Local Immigration Policy in Iowa, in Immigration’s New 
Frontiers, supra note 21, at 33. 
 81. Iowa Ctr. for Immigrant Leadership & Integration, Univ. of N. Iowa, New 
Americans, New Iowans: Welcoming Immigrant and Refugee Newcomers 20 (2006). 
 82. Id. at 5–6. 
 83. Iowa’s foreign born population more than doubled from 1990 to 2005, from from 43,316 
to 103,143. Id. 
 84. Estimates based on the 2000 Census put the Latino population of Iowa in 2004 at ap-
proximately 104,119. Grey, supra note 80, at 36. 
 85. See id. at 35. 
 86. Id. at 36–37. Grey notes that 
[t]he vast majority of rural Iowans are white descendants of European settlers, but the new Io-
wans come mostly from non-European and developing regions . . . . Iowa communities . . . are 
now integrated into a global labor market in which Iowans no longer compete with each other 
for jobs but with people from literally around the world. 
Id. 
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immigrants to the state, in addition to encouraging Iowans to come home or 
stay put in the first place. Among the big ideas initially embraced by Vilsack 
were the declaration of Iowa as an “immigrant enterprise zone,” through 
which Iowa would seek an exemption from federal quotas on immigration in 
order to attract immigrants to the state, and the creation of three model cities 
for new Iowans, each of which would receive a $50,000 grant from the state 
and resources to create programs to attract and integrate immigrants.87  
Needless to say, reaction to these proposals was swift, and reelection 
pressures (and thoughts of a future presidential campaign, perhaps) led  
Vilsack to scale back his ambitions. Though 59% of respondents to one poll 
believed immigrants were performing jobs that might otherwise go unfilled, 
and 61% of respondents to another supported the idea of recruiting immi-
grants,88 the particular methods recommended by the Council apparently 
pushed the idea too far. The immigrant enterprise zone idea never got off the 
ground, and though the model cities plan was initially implemented, the pro-
jects were abandoned a few years later. By 2002, Vilsack’s vision had been 
reduced to the Iowa English Language Reaffirmation Act, which declared 
English the official language of the state and encouraged the assimilation of 
immigrants.89 Vilsack signed the bill without ceremony, and though the law 
had virtually no teeth due to a long list of exceptions attached to it, its pas-
sage seemed to mark a decisive end to Iowa’s short-lived immigration 
experiment.90 
Though the immigrant enterprise zones never became policy (and it’s 
not clear they could have without difficult-to-obtain authorization from 
Congress), the state continues to chart its own course on the immigration 
issue. The original report of the Strategic Planning Council provides a tem-
plate for state action that could be viable in a distinct political climate. Since 
2005, the legislature appears to have adopted a more middling course. 
Lawmakers have encouraged the funding of language services in various 
sectors and further amended the state’s official language law to remove re-
straints on the publishing of non-English-language advertising in English-
language papers.91 They also have considered ways to streamline the process 
by which legal immigrants can obtain professional licenses in the state and 
contemplated permitting unauthorized students to pay in-state tuition at the 
state’s public schools.  
At the administrative level, efforts to improve state services to immi-
grants, primarily by expanding capacity to deliver qualified translation and 
interpretation, have continued.92 To address the fact that federal law renders 
unauthorized children ineligible for Medicaid, which in turn imposes costs 
                                                                                                                      
 87. Id. at 38–40. 
 88. Id. at 40–41. 
 89. Id. at 44–46. 
 90. Id. at 46. 
 91. See id. at 61–63. 
 92. See id. at 56, 61, 64–65. 
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on the hospitals where they inevitably seek treatment, the state supports a 
network of health care clinics outside the state system to provide care for 
unauthorized children. The state’s Hawk-I program, which initially targeted 
low-income children not eligible for Medicaid, has been expanded to in-
clude all children regardless of status.93 And state officials have continued to 
implement some of the Iowa 2010 plan’s provisions; eight “New Iowans 
centers” designed to help immigrants integrate into local communities have 
opened. Though they are minimally funded, the rules that govern the centers 
are part of the state’s administrative code.94 And, perhaps most important, 
“many community leaders have recognized that they cannot wait for state 
policymakers and therefore must fend for themselves in making the new 
Iowa work.”95 In other words, not only do the processes of integration con-
tinue in the absence of bold state initiatives, the politics of immigration may 
well be such that centralized initiatives, whether at the state or federal level, 
sometimes elevate the ideological above the practical, to the disadvantage of 
all parties whose interests are at stake. 
B. The Particular Problem of Unauthorized Migration 
The question of what to do about the presence of twelve million unau-
thorized immigrants in the United States dominates the current immigration 
debate at all levels of government. The conflicting interests that tie public 
officials in knots are most apparent in this context, as are the limits of fed-
eral control over immigration. The federal government, in policing 
unauthorized immigration, is essentially trying to perform two functions: to 
police borders and enforce the law while facilitating efficient labor markets 
and economic development, which depend on the inexpensive labor that 
unauthorized immigrants provide. The federal government is therefore walk-
ing the line between giving full effect to the limitations it has set on 
immigrant admissions and thwarting the decisions and preferences of U.S. 
consumers, whose market preferences have helped give rise to the unauthor-
ized population.  
The federal government has the power to ameliorate this conflict by ex-
panding the legal channels through which unskilled labor can enter the 
United States. But as recent events have shown, such reform efforts are po-
litically fraught. Comprehensive immigration reform tends to occur once in 
a generation, if at all. In other words, the inability of the federal government 
to “solve” the unauthorized problem is not so much a failure as it is evi-
dence that comprehensive immigration reform is elusive. The interests in 
play are too diverse to produce even a minimally acceptable consensus pol-
icy.96 At the end of the day, national policy cannot capture the preferences of 
                                                                                                                      
 93. Anrig & Wang, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
 94.  Grey, supra note 80, at 64. 
 95. Id. at 66. 
 96. Even if Congress could pass reform, illegal immigration is likely to persist on some 
level. See, e.g., Gordon H. Hanson, The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration 30 (2007), 
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a large and diffuse population. We cannot escape the need for a mechanism 
that enables people to express their diverse positions on unauthorized migra-
tion.97  
These “diverse positions” are reflected in the range of measures states 
and localities have adopted to address the unauthorized phenomenon. High-
profile attention has been paid to the IIRAs. But local reaction to unauthor-
ized immigration has been taking shape for years, and the nature of the 
response has been much more varied than the current national media cover-
age suggests. In contrast to the IIRAs, which attempt to solve a problem by 
making it disappear, some state and local governments proceed from the 
premise that the presence of some unauthorized immigrants is inevitable and 
therefore must be accommodated. Local governments, in particular, have 
public health and safety concerns that have led some to adopt policies, such 
as noncooperation laws, that could be characterized as facilitating illegal 
immigration and thus as inconsistent with federal policy. In this Section, I 
consider the variety of responses states and localities have adopted, with a 
view to capturing the diverse ways similarly situated communities approach 
this critical aspect of the immigration question. 
1. A Restrictionist Typology 
State and local measures designed to prevent or diminish unauthorized 
immigration can be broken down roughly into three categories: direct en-
forcement, indirect enforcement, and benefits restriction. Direct 
enforcement measures include decisions by state and local law enforcement 
to cooperate with the federal government pursuant to section 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act,98 which authorizes states and localities to 
enter into agreements with the federal government, which in turn authorize 
local and state officials to arrest and detain individuals for immigration vio-
lations and to investigate immigration cases.99 Direct enforcement also 
includes measures—such as those passed in Georgia,100 Oklahoma,101  
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/12969/economic_logic_of_illegal_immigration.html 
(follow “download the full text of the report here” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).  
 97. This tension is by no means limited to the immigration context. See infra notes 289–292 
and accompanying text for discussion of diverse local preferences in the environmental and human 
rights contexts.  
 98. According to information publicly available, ICE has entered into 287(g) agreements 
with thirteen entities: the Alabama Department of Public Safety/State Police, the Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and the counties of Maricopa, 
Arizona; Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, and San Bernardino, California; Cobb, Georgia;  
Alamance, Gaston, and Mecklenberg, North Carolina; and Davidson, Tennessee. U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, Delegation of Immigration Authority: Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/070622factsheet287gprogover.htm (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 99. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000). There is a considerable literature on the wisdom of entering 
into these agreements. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immi-
gration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084 (2004).  
 100. The language of the Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act is as follows:  
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Colorado,102 and Prince William County, Virginia103—requiring state and 
local police to verify the status of those who have come into their custody, 
usually for committing a felony or a driving-under-the-influence offense. 
And direct enforcement involves the least common and most legally suspect 
measures to have appeared of late104—state laws that criminalize illegal en-
try into the state or authorize state and local police to enforce immigration 
laws directly, even in the absence of an agreement with the federal govern-
ment, which legislators in Arizona have contemplated passing.105  
Indirect enforcement measures are exemplified by the provisions in the 
IIRAs, which would penalize landlords, up to $5,000 per violation, for rent-
ing to unauthorized immigrants. These laws would require landlords to 
perform enforcement functions by verifying the immigration status of 
would-be renters.106 Though the ordinances do not require landlords to report 
unauthorized immigrants or give landlords power to arrest and detain immi-
                                                                                                                      
(a) When any person charged with a felony or with driving under the influence . . . is con-
fined, for any period . . . a reasonable effort shall be made to determine the nationality of the 
person so confined.  
(b) If the prisoner is a foreign national, the keeper of the jail . . . shall make a reasonable ef-
fort to verify that the prisoner has been lawfully admitted to the United States. . . . through a 
query to the Law Enforcement Support Center (LSEC) of the United States Department of 
Homeland Security . . . . If the prisoner is determined not to be lawfully admitted to the United 
States, the keeper of the jail or other officer shall notify the United States Department of 
Homeland Security. 
S.B. 529 § 5(a)-(b), 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006). 
 101. H.B. 1804 § 5, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007) (requiring that police make a “reason-
able effort” to determine the status of persons in custody charged with driving under the influence or 
with a felony). 
 102. S.B. 90, § 1, 2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Co. 2006) (requiring officers to report sus-
pected unlawful immigrants to ICE). 
 103. Res. Offered by Supervisor John T. Stirrup (Prince William County, Va. June 26, 2007) 
(text on file with author) (“County Police Officers shall inquire into the citizenship or immigration 
status of any person detained for a violation of a state law or municipal ordinance . . . the Police 
Department shall verify whether of [sic] not the person is lawfully present in the United States 
. . . .”).  
 104. In 2002, controversy erupted when an Office of Legal Counsel memo finding that state 
and local police had inherent authority to enforce immigration law came to light. See Memorandum 
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Attorney General John 
Ashcroft (Apr. 2, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. Though full 
treatment of the inherent authority issue is beyond the scope of this Article, my claim that exclusiv-
ity is not constitutionally justified supports the conclusion that states and localities are not 
constitutionally precluded from enforcing immigration law, but that Congress may preempt or cir-
cumscribe their authority to do so. Cf. Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The 
Inherent Authority of Local Policy to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 Alb. L. Rev. 179 (2006) (argu-
ing that states have inherent authority to enforce immigration laws, regardless of federal 
authorization). 
 105. S.B. 1157, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (criminalizing unlawful entry into the 
state); H.B. 2582, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (authorizing officers to “investigate, appre-
hend, detain or remove aliens”). 
 106. See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 §§ 5, 7.B (2006) (prohibiting landlords from 
harboring unlawful immigrants); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 § 7b (2006) (requiring landlords 
to check potential tenants’ occupancy permits issued by city indicating citizenship or lawful status). 
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grants, the ordinances are designed to make it untenable for unauthorized 
immigrants to remain in the communities that adopt them, thereby ensuring 
their migration elsewhere. Similarly, the IIRAs and similar laws passed by 
states such as Arizona target employers in an attempt to reduce the labor 
market incentive the draws illegal immigrants to the United States. These 
indirect enforcement measures would deny licenses or government contracts 
to employers who hire unauthorized migrants, thereby using state benefits to 
discourage employers from providing unauthorized migrants with the jobs 
that keep them settled in the communities in question.107 
Finally, the public benefits statutes would deny immigrants access to a 
range of services and institutions, including health care benefits and in-state 
college tuition. To accomplish this objective, several states have passed laws 
requiring public officials across a range of agencies to verify the citizenship 
or residency status of those seeking services.108 Even these measures operate 
as forms of indirect enforcement, because they discourage immigrant set-
tlement and prompt what restrictionists call “self-deportation,” or movement 
to other communities or to the home country.109 
I address the legality of these measures in Part III. Here, I consider what 
might be motivating states and localities to pass them. Obvious fiscal  
                                                                                                                      
 107. In June 2007, Janet Napolitano, governor of Arizona, signed perhaps the most severe of 
the state laws targeting employers, authorizing the revocation of an employer’s business license after 
a second finding that the employer knowingly hired an unauthorized worker. See H.B. 2779 § G(C), 
48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2007). A lawsuit against the statute based on preemption grounds 
has been filed by the Arizona Contractors Association. Complaint, Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Napolitano, No. CV 07-1355-PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. July 13, 2007) (on file with author).  
Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma have passed similar laws. H.B. 06-1343, 2006 Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (requiring state contractors to participate in the E-Verify program and author-
izing termination of contracts and damages awards upon findings of unlawful hiring); S.B. 529 § 2, 
2006 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (requiring state contractors and subcontractors to partici-
pate in E-Verify); H.B. 1804 §§ 7, 9, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2007) (requiring enrollment in E-
Verify as a condition of contracting with the state). 
 108. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-76.5-103 (2006) (requiring every “agency” or “political 
subdivision of this state” to “verify the lawful presence in the United States of any natural person 18 
years of age or older who has applied for state or local public benefits,” except in cases where ser-
vices are needed to treat emergency medical conditions, for short-term, non-cash emergency disaster 
relief, for assistance for immunizations, and for services such as soup kitchens, crisis centers, and 
short-term shelter”); S.B. 529 § 9(a) & (c), Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., Ga. Code Ann. §50-36-1 
(2006) (same); Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-76.5-103 (2006) (same).  
Voters in Arizona passed similar initiatives, known as Proposition 200 and 300, which require 
proof of citizenship for voting and access to a range of public services and deny in-state tuition to 
those who cannot prove their documentation, respectively. In Arizona and Colorado, the state attor-
neys general have issued opinions indicating how to implement the laws consistent with federal law. 
In Arizona, the Attorney General has interpreted the law not to apply to federal programs and certain 
emergency benefits. Op. Att’y Gen., No. I-04-010 (R04-036) (Ariz. Nov. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2004/I04-010.pdf; Op. Att’y Gen., No. I05-009 (R04-0400) (Ariz. 
Dec. 29, 2005), available at http://www.azag.gov/opinions/2005/I05-009.pdf.  
For the Colorado AG opinion, see Memorandum Regarding the Implementation of House Bill 
1023 from Cynthia Coffman, Chief Deputy Att’y Gen. & Jason Dunn, Deputy Att’y Gen., Colo. 
Office of the Att’y Gen., to Jon Anderson, Chief Counsel of the Governor, State of Colo. (July 19, 
2006), available at http://www.ago.state.co.us/pdf/Implementation%20of%20HB%201023.pdf. 
 109. See Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition Through 
Enforcement, Backgrounder (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), May 2005, at 1, 3, avail-
able at http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back605.pdf. 
RODRIGUEZ FINAL TYPE MR.DOC 1/7/2008 8:32 AM 
594 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:567 
 
concerns, fueled by the perception that unlawful immigrants overly burden 
state and local institutions, such as hospitals and schools, without paying 
taxes are clearly in play. Communities are also jumping on the enforcement 
bandwagon because they seek control over their rapidly changing environ-
ments. When state and local legislators defend these measures, they tend to 
adopt the “rule-of-law” pose, contending that they are opposing only illegal 
immigration.110 They thus seek a mechanism through which they themselves 
can address what their constituents perceive to be health and safety con-
cerns.  
But these measures also reflect a desire for a different sort of control—a 
control over cultural evolution. In fact, it would be a mistake to characterize 
the state and local regulatory trend solely as a response to unauthorized im-
migration and therefore as a trend that would be abated were Congress to 
solve the illegality problem. The IIRAs reflect a pronounced reaction to the 
three significant immigration trends outlined in Part I, representing part of a 
larger struggle to adapt to and resist immigration-related change more gen-
erally. Indeed, the fact that many of the local ordinances include official 
English declarations suggests that localities are concerned with more than 
illegal immigration. The declarations not only proclaim the need for com-
monality but also claim that “in today’s modern society, [the city] may also 
need to protect and preserve the rights of those who speak only the English 
language.”111 Whether the issue is day laborers congregating on street cor-
ners, the perception of overburdened public hospitals, or the dramatic rise of 
non-English-speaking students in local schools, localities are reaching for 
ways to handle what many people perceive to be threats to their way of life. 
In the same way that immigrants often seek to insulate themselves from the 
challenges of life in a new society by relying on networks of co-ethnics, 
local communities are attempting to insulate themselves from demographic 
changes that feel overwhelming. 
Elsewhere I have written about the importance of burden-shifting in the 
immigration context—of ensuring that our laws, in addition to requiring that 
immigrants adapt to their new environments, also encourage and expect cur-
rent residents to adapt to a changing world.112 But the tricky aspect of this 
burden-shifting idea is that it also requires buy-in on the part of participants. 
Immigrants, in a sense, have already accepted the need to adapt. Acceptance 
is inherent in the act of migration in most instances, and immigrants, almost 
by definition, are self-starting and adaptable. But the buy-in of members of 
the receiving society is typically more difficult to secure: receiving societies 
                                                                                                                      
 110. See, e.g., Louis Barletta Testimony at 57:24-58:12, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 477 (2007) (No. 3:06cv1586) (“when I give testimony how I welcome and have welcomed 
the new immigrants, I am talking about legal immigrants. Illegal aliens are an entire different group 
of individuals.”). 
 111. Hazleton, Pa., Official English Ordinance 2006-19 (2006), available at http://www. 
smalltowndefenders.com/090806/2006-19%20_Official%20English.pdf.  
 112. Rodríguez, supra note 59. 
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persist in viewing immigration as something that happens to them, as op-
posed to a bidirectional process in which they participate.  
Securing this buy-in ultimately requires permitting discussion over these 
issues to unfold. Because of the diversity of interests at stake in the immi-
gration issue, it is impossible to have this conversation mediated solely 
through national institutions, which are structurally incapable of reflecting 
distinctly different community values. Local political processes are crucial 
to developing the receiving society’s coping mechanisms, even if those 
processes are connected to one another through national activist networks.  
My instinct is that the IIRAs represent a temporary and actually quite 
limited outburst brought on by unusually high levels of unauthorized immi-
gration and a hyperactive media during a period of heightened national 
awareness of immigration.113 But many states and localities, when faced with 
the consequences of their measures—namely, high legal fees, the disappear-
ance of immigrant populations that had revitalized dying former industrial 
towns, and the high administrative costs of enforcement114—will start recon-
sidering the extremity of their policies. Once the national debate has 
subsided (particularly if Congress passes meaningful immigration reform in 
the next two years) most local communities will revert to compromise posi-
tions of some sort, perhaps participating in 287(g) agreements while 
abandoning city-led enforcement measures such as landlord penalties. 
The acrimonious public debate that this wave of local ordinances has 
engendered is alarming, to be sure. The IIRAs are arguably the contempo-
rary manifestations of California’s infamous Proposition 187, which would 
have excluded unauthorized immigrants and their children from most state 
benefits and institutions (including the public schools). Like Proposition 
187, the IIRAs reflect growing unease with unauthorized immigration. And 
like Proposition 187, the supporters of the IIRAs have used the illegality 
issue as a disquieting cover for the expression of hostile and even nativist 
sentiments.115 But if immigration history teaches us anything, it is that this 
sort of controversy is a perennial feature of American life, even when litiga-
tion is successful in temporarily stopping some initiatives, as it was in 
preventing the implementation of Proposition 187.116 
Permitting the local debate to continue and take shape through lawmak-
ing processes may well be the better strategy for changing attitudes than 
                                                                                                                      
 113. Valley Park, Missouri, has jettisoned the landlord provisions of its ordinance. Though 
this move required a state court’s intervention, city officials chose not to adjust the ordinance to 
conform to state landlord-tenant law. 
 114. Colorado’s strict law requiring proof of citizenship to access public services has gone 
unenforced, largely due to cost. See Mark P. Couch, Immigration laws stymied, Denver Post, Aug. 
6, 2007, at B1; see also Jill P. Capuzzo, Town Pulls Back on Immigration Law, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 
2007, at B2 (noting that Riverside, New Jersey, repealed its IIRA in light of “mounting legal costs 
and declining public outcry,” and quoting a local business owner who observed that the law cost the 
town $50,000 per week in lost business from Brazilians and Latinos). 
 115. For a discussion of the anti-Mexican sentiment behind Proposition 187, see Kevin R. 
Johnson, Racism, Nativism, and Proposition 187, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 629, 641 (1995). 
 116. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(permanently enjoining most of Proposition 187 on preemption grounds).  
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aggressive preemption-based litigation strategies that stop this negotiation 
process in medias res.117 In advocating such dialogue, I do not mean to sug-
gest that courts have no role to play. In fact, the litigation in Valley Park and 
Hazleton has been invaluable for a number of reasons. First, the lawyers 
have developed an extensive factual record on the municipal processes that 
produced the ordinances, testing the empirical claims on which the ordi-
nances are based. Through witness testimony, the court battles also have 
helped reveal how complex policing immigration can be. And the litigation 
has highlighted the significant potential costs of the ordinances, not only for 
the economies of the local communities, but also for the broader Latino 
community.  
My claim, instead, is that court decisions that reject state and local ef-
forts outright as ultra vires, instead of approaching potential preemption 
questions narrowly, thwart what should be an ongoing dialogue about these 
issues at the state and local levels.118 Tolerance of some disharmony is re-
quired for the various moving parts of our immigration system to function. 
Accepting the costs of some of these local ordinances may be necessary to 
negotiate effectively the deep ideological divisions on this issue.119 
2. Day Labor Centers 
At least since the late 1990s, localities have been grappling with how 
best to handle the rise in the number of day laborers congregating on street 
corners and in Home Depot parking lots awaiting the arrival of employers 
offering them a day’s work, usually in construction or landscaping. In a re-
cent and groundbreaking study on the day laborer phenomenon, Abel 
Valenzuela found that day laborers are not all desperate, recently arrived job 
seekers. They are, instead, diverse in terms of their family structures, prior 
education,120 length of time they have been in the United States (almost a 
quarter have been in the United States for more than eleven years), and 
                                                                                                                      
 117. A test of this local political process approach came in May 2007, when voters in Farmers 
Branch, Texas, a suburb of Dallas, voted to retain the IIRA passed by the city council. Alongside the 
litigation of this ordinance’s constitutionality, a group of citizens had organized a campaign to have 
the issue put to a referendum. The ordinance was approved with widespread support: clearly, the 
political process will not always win out for immigrants. But there may still be long-term benefit to 
letting local political processes grapple with these issues. 
 118. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=990968 (re-
jecting critiques of Court decisions such as Roe v. Wade on the grounds that they produce backlash 
and arguing instead that courts play an important role in an ongoing constitutional dialogue). 
 119. Howard Chang has argued that if we permit local communities to close themselves off to 
immigrants, it might serve the interest of opening up the country as a whole to immigration, though 
he also emphasizes that closure is morally wrong. Howard F. Chang, Cultural Communities in a 
Global Labor Market: Immigration Restrictions as Residential Segregation, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 
93, 97–99. 
 120. Abel Valenzuela, Jr., Working on the Margins: Immigrant Day Labor Characteristics and 
Prospects for Employment 7 (Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univ. Cal., San Diego, 
Working Paper No. 22, 2000) (noting that more than a third of day laborers surveyed had nine to 
twelve years of education, but more than half had fewer than six years and five percent had none). 
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amount of time they spend working as day laborers.121 Day laborers are al-
most entirely male, with a median age of thirty-three, predominantly Latino 
(and from Mexico), and overwhelmingly unauthorized.122 They earn on av-
erage $6.91 an hour—$1.75 higher than the federal minimum wage, $1.15 
more than the California minimum wage, and just below the Los Angeles 
living wage.123 
Though the day labor phenomenon is not new—in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, day labor markets existed on waterfronts and 
in warehouses124—the current manifestation of the phenomenon is of a piece 
with the convergence of the global and local. Economists have connected 
the emergence of this informal economy to global economic activities and to 
the massive migration to cities such as New York and Los Angeles.125 But 
though day laborers are prevalent in cities, their presence has become a po-
litical issue in the suburbs, where proximity to immigration centers and a 
housing boom have conspired to attract large numbers of day laborers.  
According to those who have studied the phenomenon in detail, local 
governments essentially have three options in the face of day labor. Gov-
ernments can ignore day laborers’ impacts on the community—generally a 
short-term strategy, given that the public is quickly animated by the appear-
ance of immigrant men gathering in public spaces.126 Some governments 
have attempted to repress the phenomenon by harassing day laborers, fining 
and jailing them for loitering, and reporting contractors who hire day labor-
ers to the IRS and ICE.127 Finally, many localities have chosen to regulate 
day laborers. Though the informal market in which day laborers participate 
is characterized by its separation from regulated institutions,128 some locali-
ties have attempted to impose formal structures on the market through the 
creation of day labor centers or hiring halls.  
According to one estimate, as of January 2006, approximately sixty-
three day labor worker centers existed in the United States, in addition to 
hundreds of informal hiring sites.129 Two types of regulated worker sites 
have appeared. In some instances, private home improvement stores such as 
                                                                                                                      
 121. Id. at 6, 10–11.  
 122. Id. at 6–7. 
 123. Id. at 12. 
 124. Gregory M. Maney et al., Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: The Impact of 
Government Responses to Day Labor Markets 5 (Ctr. for Study of Labor & Democracy, Hofstra 
Univ., Working Paper No. 11, 2006). 
 125. Valenzuela, supra note 120, at 1. 
 126. Maney et al., supra note 124, at 14. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Manuel Castells & Alejandro Portes, Introduction to The Informal Economy: 
Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries 1, 3 (Alejandro Portes et al. eds., 1989). 
 129. Abel Valenzuala, Jr., et al. On the Corner: Day Labor in the United States 6 
(2006), http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/uicued/Publications/RECENT/onthecorner.pdf. See also Janice 
Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream 3 (2006) (dis-
cussing the larger phenomenon of immigrant worker centers). 
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Home Depot, sometimes aided by the city, provide workers with a slight 
shelter under which to stand and charge a standing fee to workers who use 
it. In other instances, advocacy organizations combine with local govern-
ments and nongovernmental organizations to provide a social services–type 
operation or to create centers that provide bathrooms, sponsor self-help 
workshops, and set rules by which day laborers and employers must abide 
when accepting or offering work.130 
Both types of centers have emerged in communities where the public 
health and safety costs of having groups of men congregating in parking lots 
waiting for contractors, who in turn run unregulated construction sites, seem 
greater than the cost of admitting that unlawful hiring is occurring. But the 
social service–type centers also reflect a desire to integrate a population that 
Valenzuela has shown is not necessarily transitory. Like the larger phe-
nomenon of immigrant worker centers that has emerged in recent years, 
these day labor centers are a modern-day version of the nineteenth-century 
settlement houses that provided immigrants with social services and civic 
education.131 Among the services the most developed worker centers offer 
are legal representation for unpaid wages (a common phenomenon for day 
laborers), English-language and civics classes, workers’ rights education 
programs, access to health clinics, and assistance opening bank accounts 
and securing loans.132 The centers also serve as bases for advocacy and for 
organizing and instructing immigrants in how to engage in collective action 
to defend their interests.133 Indeed, the rise of immigrant worker centers gen-
erally is partially explained by the decline of organized labor and the 
“institutional narrowness” of the current labor movement.134 
These centers, in a sense, regularize and even formalize a labor market 
that operates in the shadow of federal law, developing the citizenship capac-
ity of workers with no legal status. The centers and the communities that 
sponsor them thus create tension with a federal legal regime that has defined 
the workers who participate in the centers as unlawful. Not surprisingly, the 
centers have generated extraordinary controversy, precisely because they are 
perceived as legitimating illegal conduct.135 Some centers have lost their 
                                                                                                                      
 130. Valenzuela, supra note 120, at 9. 
 131. See, e.g., Louise W. Knight, Citizen: Jane Addams and the Struggle for Democ-
racy 275 (2005) (describing Hull House in Chicago, which included a coffee house selling food, a 
gym, and showers, as well as observing that Jane Addams “saw in the buildings an expression of the 
settlement’s conviction that ‘education and recreation ought to be extended to the immigrants’ ”). 
 132. Fine, supra note 129, at 2. 
 133. Cf. id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Day laborers are also routinely subject to hostile action, sometimes by local govern-
ments. In late 2006, the Southern District of New York held that the town of Mamaroneck had 
violated the federal Equal Protection Clause by excluding day laborers from a public park, finding 
that the debates surrounding the city’s decision demonstrated that the city’s intent was racially dis-
criminatory. Doe v. Village of Mamaroneck, 462 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Local 
government officials (on Long Island, in particular) make it a habit of fining and arresting day la-
borers. Some advocates claim that this practice sparks physical assaults, robberies, and threats by 
merchants and strangers. See Maney et al., supra note 124. 
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funding and others have never gotten off the ground, due in large part to the 
issue’s political sensitivity. 
The experience of Herndon, Virginia, provides a case in point. In De-
cember 2005, Herndon’s city council decided to fund a day labor center, 
which became one of the first such centers to attract national media atten-
tion. In 2006, approximately 100 workers signed in each day looking for 
work. The workers studied English and volunteered at community social 
events while waiting for jobs or in their time off.136 The 2006 annual report 
of the not-for-profit entity that ran the site documented that the workers who 
used the site agreed upon a minimum wage among themselves, and that 
nonpayment of workers was virtually nonexistent, in contrast to the treat-
ment of day laborers in other parts of the country. But though the publicly 
funded site functioned well for several months, political pressures eventu-
ally led to the ouster, in May 2006, of the city officials who had spearheaded 
the idea.137 Once in office, the new town council resolved to hand over the 
site to a private employment company who would be required to check the 
documentation of workers who appeared at the site.138 But on September 14, 
2007, the city closed the center’s doors, preferring to end the experiment 
than comply with a Fairfax County court order requiring the center to be 
open to all workers.139 
Litigation against the center, based primarily on a preemption theory, 
also has been filed, though it is now presumably moot in light of the closing. 
A group of taxpayers challenged the legality of Herndon’s allocation of pub-
lic property to establish the day labor site, arguing that the measure was not 
a garden-variety land-use regulation, but rather a measure intended to en-
able, facilitate, aid, and abet illegal immigrants in procuring unlawful 
employment.140 According to their complaint, by “inducing” illegal immi-
grants to come to Herndon and by facilitating their hire, the city was 
frustrating the purposes of the comprehensive immigration regulation that 
Congress adopted in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”).141 
In other words, federal law preempted the city’s actions. 
Day labor centers thus may not represent an alternative form of organi-
zation that will help facilitate the rise of a social movement—a role some of 
their advocates have claimed for them. In highlighting the day labor center, I 
therefore do not mean to celebrate the trend. Rather, I seek to underscore 
                                                                                                                      
 136. Karin Brulliard, Herndon Day Labor Center Declares Its First Year a Success, Wash. 
Post, Feb. 25, 2007, at T05. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Karin Brulliard, ‘What We had Here Was a Family’; As Herndon’s Day-Laborer Center 
Closes, Job Seekers Band to Find Another Site, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 2007, at B01. 
 140. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Town of Herndon’s Demurrer to 
Amended Bill of Complaint at 2, Karunakaram v. Town of Herndon, Chancery No. 2005-4013, 2006 
WL 408389 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 2006). 
 141. Second Amended Bill of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 72–76, 
Karunakaram v. Town of Herndon, Chancery No. 2005-4013, 2006 WL 408389 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 
10, 2006). 
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that the emergence of day labor centers represents a decision about how best 
to integrate a population that local governments cannot help but engage, 
regardless of the workers’ status under federal law. The centers have arisen 
as a response to a public safety need, and to facilitate a form of labor that 
has benefits for everyone involved. They also help prevent worker exploita-
tion by bringing hiring activity into a public and regularized setting. 
Even in Herndon, it is unlikely that the debate is over. Laborers seeking 
jobs are likely to continue to congregate in public spaces, recreating the 
conditions that gave rise to the center in the first place. Not only will the 
needs of the labor market ensure the persistence of this congregation, the 
Fairfax County court, along with courts elsewhere in the country, have held 
that the First Amendment restrains localities from passing ordinances that 
prohibit the solicitation of work in public places, unless the municipality 
provides an adequate alternative forum for the protected communication.142 
Municipalities like Herndon may find themselves with no other choice but 
to open hiring halls. The opening of hiring centers is only a compromise 
measure: it cannot solve the underlying legality issue. But the centers ad-
dress the inevitability of an informal, unauthorized economy and attempt to 
ameliorate some of the more serious costs of this market to the community 
and the workers. 
3. Sanctuary Laws 
For decades, major cities and a few small towns across the country have 
adopted various so-called sanctuary laws, or statutes, resolutions, and execu-
tive orders that limit the authority and ability of local and state authorities to 
cooperate with federal officials in the enforcement of immigration laws.143 
The sanctuary movement took shape in the 1980s, when churches and other 
affiliated private organizations began providing safe havens for nationals of 
El Salvador and Guatemala, who had fled brutal civil wars and were thought 
                                                                                                                      
 142. See Town of Herndon v. Thomas, MI-2007-644 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2007) (striking 
down an antisolicitation law on grounds that the temporary hiring site adopted by the town was not 
an adequate alternative forum for communication because of its temporary nature); see also Comite 
de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 962 (C.D. Cal. 
2006) (finding that private parking lots were not an adequate channel of communication for solicit-
ing employment); Comite de Jornaleros de Glendale v. City of Glendale, No. CV 04-3521-SJO 
(C.D. Cal. May 16, 2005) (permanently enjoining an antisolicitation ordinance on First Amendment 
grounds).  
 143. See generally Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Rights not to Cooperate? Local Sover-
eignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1373, 1382–95 (2006). Los Angeles, 
for example, has had some type of sanctuary policy since 1979. The current version of the law is 
embodied in Special Order 40, under which police officers are authorized to communicate informa-
tion regarding immigration status to federal authorities when the alien in question has been involved 
in a felony or a high grade misdemeanor. In May 2006, Judicial Watch brought a suit against this 
policy, which remains pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. Among the organization’s claims is 
that the sanctuary policy is unconstitutional, because the Supreme Court has made clear that “the 
federal government bears the exclusive responsibility for immigration matters,” and that state laws 
that stand as an obstacle to the enforcement of federal law are a nullity. Complaint at ¶¶ 15–31, 
Sturgeon v. Bratton, No. BC351646 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 1, 2006). 
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to have been denied asylum wrongfully.144 Cities and states supported these 
efforts with resolutions declaring that such asylum seekers need not fear 
arrest in their jurisdictions.  
In some quarters, these laws evolved into more general ordinances that 
prohibited local law enforcement from conveying information about indi-
viduals’ immigration status to federal officials.145 Eventually, cities with no 
ties to the original sanctuary movement began passing similar generalist 
resolutions prohibiting information disclosure by public authorities. Many 
of these resolutions served as direct legislative and administrative responses 
to the federal government’s expanding efforts to enlist state and local police 
voluntarily in the enforcement of immigration laws in the years after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  
In the midst of these developments, and as part of the 1996 immigration 
reforms, Congress passed two provisions146 that prohibited local govern-
ments from preventing their employees from voluntarily conveying 
information regarding any individual’s immigration status to federal authori-
ties.147 The enforcement issue thus highlights the tension between federal, 
state, and local approaches to managing migration. On the one hand, locali-
ties that have adopted sanctuary laws have sought to define for themselves 
the parameters of their law enforcement authority and the duties of their 
workforce, particularly those civil servants who perform public health and 
safety functions.148 On the other hand, the federal government has increas-
                                                                                                                      
 144. For a discussion of the ideology and foreign policy goals of this movement, see Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy 1206–07 (4th ed. 2005). 
 145. See, for example, developments in the city of San Francisco. The city adopted a sanctu-
ary ordinance in 1985, declaring the city a refuge for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees and 
prohibiting city officials from discriminating against Salvadorans and Guatemalans on the basis of 
immigration status. Pham, supra note 143, at 1387 n.68. This ordinance eventually took on a more 
general form in 1989 when the city prohibited its employees from “[r]equesting information about, 
or disseminating information regarding” immigration status, unless legally required to do so. San 
Francisco, Cal., Administrative Code § 12H.2(c) (2005) (approved Oct. 24, 1989). The city 
reinforced this ordinance after September 11, 2001 by reminding police officers of the ordinance’s 
existence. Pham, supra note 143, at 1387 n.68. 
 146. Section 434 of the Welfare Reform Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2000), provides that “[N]o 
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or 
receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States,” and section 642 of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (2000), provides that 
governments may not prevent their employees from “[e]xchanging such information with any other 
Federal, State, or local government entity.” The report accompanying the Senate version of the bill 
noted: “[A]cquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related information by State and 
local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of considerable assistance to, the Federal regulation 
of immigration and the achieving of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.” S. Rep. No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996). 
 147. Because these federal provisions do not require states and localities to report information 
to the federal government, seeking only to remove state and local restraints on voluntary coopera-
tion, they do not appear to represent unconstitutional commandeering under the terms of Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding a 
federal law that prohibited states from disclosing personal information of drivers license applicants 
because the law did not require state officials to help enforce federal laws). 
 148. See, e.g., City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789, 797–98 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(noting New York City’s claims to this effect), aff’d, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
RODRIGUEZ FINAL TYPE MR.DOC 1/7/2008 8:32 AM 
602 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 106:567 
 
ingly sought to remove state and local obstacles to its immigration enforce-
ment and information-gathering goals. Each entity has clearly legitimate 
objectives that are nonetheless difficult to reconcile. 
The nature of this conflict is perhaps best highlighted by the evolution of 
New York City’s position on this issue. On June 6, 2003, Michael 
Bloomberg, under pressure from interest groups and facing potential litiga-
tion, repealed the City’s sanctuary policy, which had been in effect since 
then-mayor Ed Koch introduced the measure in 1989.149 The 1989 sanctuary 
law had prohibited city police, public school teachers, welfare workers, 
health care professionals, and other public employees from giving informa-
tion about a person’s immigration status to federal officials unless that 
person was accused of a crime150—a prohibition that to Mayor Bloomberg 
appeared to directly conflict with the 1996 federal immigration reforms. In 
an effort to bring city policy in line with federal law, Mayor Bloomberg is-
sued Executive Order 34,151 which launched what was quickly dubbed a 
“Don’t Ask, Do Tell” policy, instructing city employers not to ask about an 
individual’s status but permitting (though not requiring) employers to 
transmit status information to federal authorities if that information came to 
their attention.  
Mayor Bloomberg defended the order on the seemingly unobjectionable 
ground that it reconciled city and federal law, noting that his predecessor, 
Rudolph Giuliani, had unsuccessfully challenged the federal law as an un-
constitutional interference with the city’s right to regulate the conduct of its 
own workers.152 Nonetheless, the Executive Order, by upending longstanding 
city policy, sparked a vociferous outcry from immigrant advocates and 
members of the City Council. Opponents objected to the policy shift, in part 
because the new order appeared to give law enforcement authorities permis-
sion to inquire into immigration status, and because many public employees 
in performing their duties would inevitably be required to inquire into status 
(despite the policy’s “don’t ask” protection), which critics feared would lead 
to an upswing in reporting to federal officials.153  
In response to local opposition, Mayor Bloomberg issued Executive Or-
der 41,154 which sets out a general city privacy policy and limits the extent to 
which city officials can gather and report information regarding immigration 
                                                                                                                      
 149. City of N.Y. Exec. Order No. 124 (Aug. 1989), available at http://courts.state.ny.us/ 
library/queens/PDF_files/Orders/ord124.pdf. 
 150. See Alisa Solomon, Don’t Ask, Do Tell: Outcry Over New City Policy on Reporting the 
Undocumented States Stuns the Mayor, Village Voice, July 15, 2003, at 46, available at 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0328,solomon,45387,1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 151. City of N.Y. Exec. Order No. 34 (May 13, 2003) (on file with author). 
 152. See City of New York, 971 F. Supp. 789 (holding that a federal statute was not a violation 
of Supreme Court’s commandeering doctrine because it did not require city officials to provide 
information to the federal government), aff’d, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). After the decision, Mayor 
Giuliani declared that the City would keep its policy in place, in defiance of federal law. 
 153. See Solomon, supra note 150. 
 154. City of N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003) available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
imm/downloads/pdf/exe_order_41.pdf. 
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status. According to the order, city officials and employees are instructed not 
to disclose confidential information unless the law requires disclosure.155 In 
the case of information relating to immigration status, the order erects a pre-
sumption against disclosure, unless “the individual to whom such 
information pertains is suspected . . . of engaging in illegal activity, other 
than mere status as an undocumented alien.”156 The order further restrains 
city employees, other than law enforcement, from inquiring into immigra-
tion status and authorizes law enforcement to inquire into immigration 
status only when investigating illegal activity, other than mere status as an 
unauthorized alien.157 And thus the tension with federal law has been re-
introduced by a city administration aware of the potential conflict but also 
highly responsive to the interests of immigrants who feed its economy.  
The sanctuary phenomenon, both in its original form and in the form of 
the anti–information sharing measures, thus underscores the complex dy-
namic presented by immigration enforcement.158 When understood in 
contrast to the willingness of some police departments to enter into 287(g) 
agreements to cooperate with federal officials to enforce immigration laws, 
the existence of sanctuary laws highlights the range of views held by public 
officials and local communities on the subject of how best to interact with 
unauthorized populations—a judgment that goes to the heart of a city’s abil-
ity to promote public health, safety, and welfare, and to govern its 
residents.159 Indeed, in affirming the district court’s rejection of Mayor 
Giuliani’s constitutional challenge to the 1996 federal restrictions on non-
cooperation laws, the Second Circuit acknowledged the interests of state and 
                                                                                                                      
 155. Id. § 2(b). 
 156. Id. § 2(e) (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. §§ 3–4. 
 158. This conflict of objectives takes on further complexity when we consider the state laws 
that would preempt local sanctuary laws. Mirroring the 1996 federal reforms and federal efforts to 
enlist state and local officials since September 11, 2001, some states have passed statutes that re-
quire their local subentities to cooperate in immigration enforcement. See, e.g., S.B. 90 § 1, 2006 
Leg. (Colo. 2006) (prohibiting state or local government from enacting legislation that impedes 
cooperation with federal officials); S.B. 2771, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2006); S.B. 9, 2006 Leg. 
(Ohio 2006); S.B. 2716, 224th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (prohibiting state and local governments 
from impeding law enforcement cooperation with federal authorities); see also H.B. 2386, 47th 
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2005) (declaring that the police shall (or may) cooperate with the De-
partment of Homeland Security or Immigration and Customs Enforcement to enforce immigration 
laws); Ariz. Proposition 200 (2004) (requiring enforcement officers to report suspected immigration 
law violations to the federal government); S.B. 529, 2006 Leg. (Ga. 2006); H.B. 1383, 114th Gen. 
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006); H.B. 855, 47th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006). 
 159. Some cities have begun to resent the ways in which Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment has ramped up its enforcement tactics since late 2006. E.g., Leslie Berestein, Immigration 
operation draws complaints, San Diego Union-Trib., Mar. 28, 2007, at B3 (“Some say the ran-
domness of who gets questioned or detained is enough to paralyze some neighborhoods with fear.”); 
Immigration Vigils (Latino USA podcast Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.utexas.edu/coc/ 
kut/latinousa/stationservices/podcast/2007/03/0323_01_lusa_podcast.mp3 (last visited Oct. 7, 
2007). The fallout from these raids, which includes children left without guardians, heightened 
anxiety in immigrant communities of mixed status resulting in further retreat into the so-called 
“shadows,” and drop-off in commerce in immigrant-dominated communities, underscores how 
federal enforcement objectives and the integration, health, and safety goals of local communities are 
often at odds.  
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local governments in protecting the confidentiality of the public by regulat-
ing the information gathering conducted by its officials. The court suggested 
that were the City to adopt a generally applicable confidentiality policy—
the policy Mayor Bloomberg ultimately adopted—it might be able to sub-
stantiate its claim that federal preemption amounts to an unconstitutional 
intrusion on the city’s power to regulate the duties of its officials.160  
The cities that have passed sanctuary laws appear to be motivated by at 
least three concerns. First, the laws reflect localities’ desire to reduce immi-
grant suspicion of the police, for obvious public safety reasons, and to 
ensure that immigrant communities cooperate with law enforcement. As the 
Los Angeles sanctuary order declares, “The [LAPD] is sensitive to the prin-
ciple that effective law enforcement depends on a high degree of 
cooperation between the Department and the public it serves.”161 The order 
thus concludes that “it is the [determination] of the Los Angeles Policy De-
partment that undocumented alien status in itself is not a matter for police 
action.”162 
Second, and in a similar vein, the anti-information sharing laws reflect 
the determination that ensuring effective delivery of services requires pro-
moting trust in the government generally. New York’s Executive Order 41, 
for example, emphasizes the city’s need to interact with all of its popula-
tions, observing that its capacity to gather information and perform the 
functions of government depend on resident trust.163 The preamble to the 
order begins as follows: “[I]ndividuals should know that they may seek and 
obtain assistance of City agencies regardless of personal or private attrib-
utes, without negative consequences to their private lives . . . .”164  
Finally, woven into these policy objectives are political judgments that 
reflect a broader kind of ideological conflict expressed across the federal-
state-local axis: sanctuary laws represent instances of local officials staking 
out political positions in some tension with federal intentions. In the case of 
the original sanctuary movement, for example, local officials expressed op-
position to U.S. foreign policy in Central America and dissatisfaction with 
the government’s failure to grant asylum to the victims of that policy. And in 
the case of the noncooperation laws, the laws reflect a general desire to 
make government institutions accessible to all people, regardless of their 
legal status, by reducing the perception among immigrants that interaction 
with public officials always raises the specter of deportation. As the Los 
Angeles executive order frames the issue, sanctuary measures are required 
because “the Los Angeles community has become significantly more di-
verse over the past several years, with substantial numbers of people from 
                                                                                                                      
 160. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 161. Los Angeles, Cal., Special Order 40 (Nov. 27, 1979). 
 162. Id. 
 163. City of N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, pmbl. (Sept. 17, 2003). 
 164. Id. 
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different cultural and sociological backgrounds migrating to this City.”165 
This phenomenon makes it incumbent upon the city, whose goal is to pro-
mote public health, safety, and social cooperation, to adjust its policies to 
reflect changing demographic realities, which include the rise of mixed legal 
and illegal communities.  
Sanctuary laws thus represent critical integration measures. Not only do 
they promote integration as a matter of policy, but by prioritizing delivery of 
services, sanctuary measures also make expressive claims. Indeed, the fact 
that many of the cities that have passed such anticooperation laws, such as 
San Francisco, New York, Los Angeles, and Seattle, possess and promote a 
self-conception as immigrant-friendly underscores that immigration en-
forcement, though primarily a federal responsibility, implicates the interests 
of a range of actors whose political processes inevitably produce challenges 
to centralized immigration directives.  
4. In-State Tuition 
As of 2007, at least ten states had passed laws that permit unauthorized 
students to pay in-state tuition at public colleges, including major immigrant-
receiving states such as Texas, California, New York, and Illinois, as well as 
some states not normally considered to be solicitous of unauthorized immi-
gration, such as Utah and Nebraska.166 The City University of New York, 
which trumpets its historical role of making higher education available to 
generations of immigrants, many of whom (namely Jews) were once ex-
cluded from more elite institutions, also permits unauthorized students to 
qualify for its subsidized tuition rates. Section 505 of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Relief and Immigrant Responsibility Act, however, provides that “an 
alien who is not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on 
the basis of residence within a State (or political subdivision) for any post-
secondary education benefit unless a citizen or national of the United States 
is eligible for such a benefit.”167 
After Congress passed this provision, lawmakers in some states con-
cluded that it denied them authority to establish a policy or regulation 
granting in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrant students.168 But most of 
                                                                                                                      
 165. Los Angeles, Cal., Special Order 40 (Nov. 27, 1979). 
 166. Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., Basic Facts about In-State Tuition for Undocu-
mented Immigrant Students (2006), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/DREAM/in-
state_tuition_basicfacts_041706.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). For a more comprehensive discus-
sion of the states that had adopted and considered in-state tuition laws as of 2004, see Michael A. 
Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act, and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 
455 (2004). By April 2006, at least thirty states had considered legislation that would allow unau-
thorized immigrants to pay in-state tuition, and legislators in six states had tried unsuccessfully to 
pass legislation banning unauthorized immigrants from receiving the benefit. Carl Krueger, In-State 
Tuition for Undocumented Immigrants, StateNotes, Aug. 2006, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/ 
61/00/6100.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).  
 167. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2007). 
 168. E.g., Op. Att’y Gen. 06-01 (Colo. Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.ago.state.co.us/ 
AGOpinions/AGO_PDFs/AGO06-1.pdf. 
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the states that have offered in-state tuition benefits have taken this step since 
1996—if not outright defying the federal government, then at least rejecting 
the principle unmistakably animating section 505: unauthorized immigrants 
have no claim to public benefits. The tuition-benefit states have negotiated 
around section 505 by making the benefit available to anyone who has at-
tended two to three years of high school in-state, thus conditioning the 
benefit not on residency, but on school attendance.  
This maneuver around federal law has been met with challenges in a va-
riety of (as-yet unsuccessful) lawsuits in California and Nebraska.169 As the 
litigation proceeds, debate continues in Congress over the long-languishing 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act (“DREAM Act”), 
which may still pass on its own, despite the collapse of comprehensive im-
migration reform.170 The Act essentially would repeal section 505, 
authorizing states to make the in-state tuition benefit available to unauthor-
ized students who meet certain criteria and providing a path to legal status 
for students who complete two years of college or military service.171 
This ongoing debate—unfolding in state houses, Congress, and the fed-
eral courts—powerfully underscores that communities reach different 
conclusions on whether and how to incorporate unauthorized immigrants 
into the political community. The interests of certain immigrant-receiving 
states clearly diverge from the conclusion that emerged from the last na-
tional political debate on this subject in 1996. This divergence can be 
explained by the mutually reinforcing imperatives of economic and political 
integration. As the Urban Institute estimated in 2003, at least 65,000 unau-
thorized students graduate from American high schools each year172—a 
phenomenon that stems in part from the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in 
Plyler v. Doe,173 which essentially restrains states from denying public edu-
cation to unauthorized immigrants. And as the American Association for 
State Colleges and Universities has observed, given the reality that “[a] large 
portion of unauthorized alien students are likely to remain in the United 
States, whether or not they have access to postsecondary education,”174 it is 
                                                                                                                      
 169. E.g., Day v. Bond, No. 04-CV-4085-RDR, 2007 WL 2452681 (Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 
2007) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring equal protection claim and lacked cause of 
action for statutory preemption claim). 
 170. See, e.g., Nicole Gaouette, Congress Quietly Returns to Immigration, L.A. Times, Sept. 
17, 2007, at A1; Julia Preston, Measure Would Offer Legal Status to Illegal Immigrant Students, 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2007, at A18. 
 171. Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., DREAM Act: Basic Information (2007), available at 
http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/DREAM/dream_basic_info_0406.pdf. The same groups that 
have filed lawsuits against current in-state tuition policies also campaign against the DREAM Act. 
In other words, their concern is not exclusively for the integrity of statutory interpretation. 
 172. In 2003, 65,000 unauthorized students had lived in the United States for at least five years. 
Jeffrey S. Passel, Further Demographic Information Relating to the DREAM Act, Memorandum from 
the Urban Institute to the National Immigration Law Center, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.nilc. 
org/immlawpolicy/DREAM/DREAM_Demographics.pdf.  
 173. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 174. Access for All: Debating In-State Tuition for Undocumented Alien Students (2005), 
http://www.aascu.org/policy/special_report/access_for_all.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
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in the fiscal and economic interests of states to enable unauthorized immi-
grants to acquire some post-secondary education, for the obvious reasons 
that students who have graduated from colleges are more productive and 
less likely to rely on government assistance.175 In addition, many states ac-
knowledge that the parents of unauthorized students pay taxes to the state, 
justifying extension of the benefit on simple fairness grounds.  
But embedded within this pragmatism is also a series of judgments 
about how adult illegal immigrants differ from their children in their moral 
stature and how broad a scope a liberal society should give to the status 
“unlawful.” The states that permit unauthorized immigrants to pay in-state 
tuition could be said to advance at least three ideas in their decision making. 
First, in-state tuition states have concluded that unauthorized students who 
have attended state high schools are not foreign students and are unlikely to 
return to their countries of national origin. Second, these states have deter-
mined that unauthorized students, by virtue of their education in the public 
schools, have been assimilated into American life. Third, some states have 
concluded that it is illiberal to permit the condition of illegality and the dis-
abilities associated with unlawful status to be passed from parents to 
children, or that we should prevent the emergence of the inherited castes 
that would result from the failure to break the chain of illegality.176  
In the end, the fact that some states have reached these judgments, 
whereas the federal government and many other states have not, underscores 
both the inevitability and value of federal-state conflict and dialogue on the 
subject of immigrant integration. The fact that states have found a clever 
route around the language of section 505, whose intent to deny unauthorized 
immigrants in-state tuition benefits seems clear on the face of the statute, 
highlights the willingness of some states to challenge federal authority on 
matters that pertain to immigrant integration. The willingness in particular 
of states such as Utah and Nebraska to extend tuition benefits underscores 
that different aspects of the immigration phenomenon will yield different 
state and local policies. In other words, states and localities that take a hard 
line on employing unauthorized immigrants might nonetheless come to a 
different conclusion when addressing back-end concerns, or the question of 
how to treat the second generation.  
Perhaps most importantly, the in-state tuition issue demonstrates that 
clearly integrative action can be easier to achieve at the state or local level 
than at the federal level, where much broader consensus must be forged. 
This fact has redounded to the benefit of immigrants, particularly in states 
where immigrants tend to concentrate. The space left open by section 505 
has ensured that states who have reached pro-integration judgments do not 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Of course, no matter how cheap college tuition is for unauthorized students, unless the 
federal government takes action to regularize or legalize these students’ statuses, college-educated 
unauthorized immigrants will still be ineligible to work lawfully in the United States.  
 176. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“Now, if any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inher-
itable. . . . [H]ere is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this 
prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice . . . .”). 
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have to wait for federal authorization to accomplish what the states have 
determined to be crucial integrative goals.  
In the end, a consensus in the states that develops over time through 
state-by-state debate may well prod the federal government to revisit its own 
laws by passing the DREAM Act. This move would free states to make key 
integration judgments without having to resort to creative readings of fed-
eral statutes and face the threat of litigation. And, it would provide the 
benefit that only the federal government can—the legal status that would 
enable once unauthorized university graduates to live and work as full 
members in the society they call home. 
* * * 
Each of the debates just discussed highlights not only the inevitability of 
conflict between the federal government and states and localities on immi-
gration-related matters, but also the possibility of a relationship between the 
levels of government that is based on dialogue and compromise. Though the 
institution of the nation-state and conceptions of national citizenship pro-
vide us with a vocabulary for understanding the effects of immigration, this 
discussion makes clear that the middling structures of the nation-state can-
not capture the diverse forms of membership needed to assimilate the effects 
of global trends—particularly effects that come in human form, with fami-
lies. As Saskia Sassen has pointed out, globalization’s challenge to the 
national is creating new political subjects that national citizenship constructs 
cannot assimilate: political subjects who do not take the traditional form of 
voter, juror, and officeholder.177 Unauthorized immigrants who have the 
“right” to own homes, hold mortgages, and send their children to public 
schools offer an example.178 Their participation is facilitated through the 
market and through local communities, not through the national govern-
ment, which has erected barriers to participation in the form of its 
admissions system.179 
Considering the possibility of diversity through the lens of some of the 
traditional justifications for federalism helps make the need for new ways of 
thinking about migration management clear. First, state and local participa-
tion in integration matters can promote efficiency. The federal government is 
not well positioned to engage in integration work—at best, it can play a co-
                                                                                                                      
 177. Sassen, supra note 29, at 278–79, 321. Sassen notes that it has always been the case that 
“narrow formal definitions [of citizenship] are increasingly inadequate” to capture the relationships 
that exist, and that recent “scholarship points to the notion that current conditions—globalization, 
growing diversity, claims by the excluded—are sharpening this dynamic.” Id. at 286; see also Blank, 
supra note 33, at 412 (“Alongside the dwindling yet still powerful nation-state, other entities—local 
authorities, religious orders, economic corporations, international and global organizations—have 
been . . . acquiring control over [citizenship] matters . . . .”). 
 178. Sassen, supra note 29, at 279. Through raising families, holding jobs, and participating 
in civic activities, Sassen notes, “[u]ndocumented immigrants’ daily practices . . . can earn them 
citizenship claims in just about all developed countries, including the United States.” Id. at 294.  
 179. These workers are not cosmopolitan, however, because they are embedded in local con-
texts. Id. at 300. 
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ordinating function. The effects of immigration are felt differently in differ-
ent parts of the country, and the disruption immigration causes, as well as 
the viability of different immigration strategies, will vary, in part, according 
to the health of local economies and the existence of ethnic social networks. 
Second, state and local participation is critical for expressive and democratic 
reasons, including securing the involvement of the immigrants themselves in 
the solutions devised—an involvement more likely to occur at the local 
level.180 And perhaps most importantly, local experimentalism will be of 
tremendous value in this context.181 The need to strike certain compromises 
or enter into agreements unlikely to be tolerated if presented as part of a 
national debate on immigration will require strong municipal action—and 
perhaps strong municipal authority. 
The question now becomes how we go about reformulating the constitu-
tional doctrines and lawmaking presumptions that structure the immigration 
debate to accommodate how states and localities themselves have been ad-
justing to a changed world. To be sure, accepting the exclusivity principle 
would not mean invalidating all of the measures I have outlined. Programs 
such as the New Iowans Centers, funding for language education and job 
training for legal immigrants, and other similar integration programs consti-
tute immigration regulation or enforcement in only the most attenuated 
sense. But most state and local efforts to manage unauthorized immigration 
(including restrictive ordinances, day labor centers, and sanctuary laws) 
would be vulnerable, because they all could be characterized as immigration 
enforcement or priority setting. The purpose of discussing these initiatives 
in tandem is to put the more aggressive forms of state and local regulation 
into a broader context, which in turn highlights that integration measures 
sometimes resemble immigration controls. This overlap is given little 
thought in a world of federal exclusivity, but the success of immigrant inte-
gration depends on it.  
III. Reimagining the Federal-State-Local Relationship 
By now it should be clear that the management of today’s immigration 
depends on the involvement of all levels of government. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, immigration control occurs through a de facto multi-
sovereign regime. This de facto regime has four important features. First, 
though federal law controls who may enter the United States, states and lo-
calities play a crucial role in integrating those who cross our borders, 
whether immigrants cross with or without the formal legal blessing of the 
federal government. Second, this integrative role is not wholly independent 
from federal law and policy; rather, the mechanisms states and localities 
                                                                                                                      
 180. Even if anti-immigrant sentiment is stronger at the local level, immigrants are more 
likely to have local voting rights and the ear of local officials, particularly in cities heavily depend-
ent on immigrants. New York City offers a case in point: members of the city council pay attention 
to the economic and social concerns of immigrants, despite the fact that few are voters. 
 181. I discuss the value of theories of local experimentalism in addressing cultural and lin-
guistic diversity in another article. Rodríguez, supra note 58. 
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develop to promote integration are responsive not only to direct federal 
mandates, but also to the effects of the federal government’s enforcement 
priorities. Third, the mechanisms states and localities adopt to manage the 
absorption of immigrants into their communities sometimes resemble immi-
gration control or enforcement, or measures that attract or deter the 
settlement of immigrants. And finally, the work of integration that states and 
localities ultimately perform clearly requires flexibility and tolerance of 
policies in tension or conflict with one another. In other words, lawmakers 
need freedom to calibrate their integration efforts to the vagaries of an am-
bivalent public opinion on the one hand and market realities and public 
health and safety demands on the other.  
This multi-sovereign regime inevitably produces conflict among the 
various subentities involved. Cities and towns within the same state may 
take distinct positions. Different actors within state governments may speak 
with different voices when they address different constituencies. And, par-
ticularly when it comes to unauthorized immigration, the officials who run 
governmental subentities, in cooperation with private partners, may take 
positions in tension with federal objectives. 
This contemporary state of affairs, on its own, should be sufficient to 
undermine the notion of federal exclusivity insofar as that principle is based 
on assumptions about structural imperatives in a federal system. When it is 
understood in historical context and in light of the nineteenth-century prac-
tice of state regulation of immigration, the de facto multi-sovereign regime 
powerfully underscores Gerald Neuman’s conclusion that the current formal 
division of authority in the immigration context is “neither natural nor inevi-
table in United States federalism or in federalism generally.”182 
But the regulatory reality contrasts sharply with the doctrinal and public 
rhetoric of exclusivity. In light of this disconnect, constitutional and immi-
gration law scholars should be asking themselves the question I take up in 
this Part: how should the integrative function played by states and localities 
change our doctrinal and conceptual understandings of immigration federal-
ism? My answer is that the particular ways in which the functional 
foundations of the federal exclusivity principle have been eroded require 
that we develop legal doctrines and lawmaking presumptions that simulta-
neously facilitate power sharing by the various levels of government and 
tolerate tension between federal objectives and state and local interests. 
I flesh out this conclusion in four stages. First, I consider how the de 
facto multi-sovereign regime should change our understandings of the con-
stitutional validity of the federal exclusivity principle based on what the 
regime reveals about the structural relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states. Second, I explore how our conceptions of preemption 
should respond to the rise of de facto power sharing between the federal 
government and state and local entities—what it would mean to “normalize” 
the immigration power, or to accept concurrent federal/state authority. Doc-
                                                                                                                      
 182. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 
Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1840 n.34 (1993). 
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trinally, it would mean that courts would take an ordinary view of preemp-
tion in the immigration context, accepting concurrent federal and state 
authority. It also would mean that features of alienage law must be re-
thought, and that federalism doctrines might limit Congress’s authority to 
regulate in some areas. Third, and more important, I argue that the regime I 
describe should lead state and federal lawmakers to employ antipreemption 
presumptions in their immigration-related decision making. Finally, I grap-
ple with the potential negative side effects of permitting forms of state and 
local participation in immigration regulation and argue that these side ef-
fects perform a valuable sorting function.  
A. The Rise and Fall of Federal Exclusivity 
The principle of federal exclusivity is based not on constitutional text or 
original understanding, but on a historically contingent structural conception 
of the relationship between the federal government and the states. Nowhere 
in the Constitution is the federal government explicitly given exclusive 
power over immigration. Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 gives Congress the 
power to “establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,” and courts in articu-
lating federal exclusivity begin and end their textual analysis with this 
clause.183 As scholars have noted, however, the other areas of law in which 
federal power is understood to be exclusive, namely patent, copyright, and 
bankruptcy, are specifically enumerated as federal powers.184  
As scholars such as Stephen Legomsky and Gerald Neuman have re-
counted in detail, the idea of federal exclusivity also is not consistent with 
original practice. Throughout the nineteenth century, states used their police 
powers to regulate migration across their borders.185 States employed inspec-
tion and quarantine laws to limit movement indirectly, and they passed 
measures explicitly prohibiting the entry of criminals and restricting the 
movement of free blacks into their jurisdictions.186  
The federal courts began limiting the states’ authority to regulate in the 
1840s,187 in part on the ground that certain of these state laws impermissibly 
burdened interstate commerce. But the courts’ concern was not to protect the 
federal government’s immigration power, per se, but to draw more general 
lines between governments to delineate the regime of dual sovereignty. The 
                                                                                                                      
 183. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941); Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 
305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 601 (E.D. Va. 2004) (upholding a Virginia state law denying unlawful immi-
grants access to a range of state benefits, including entrance to public institutions of higher 
education).  
 184. See Huntington, supra note 11 (manuscript at 15). 
 185. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in 
Britain and America 180–83, 189–90 (1987). 
 186. Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and 
Citizenship in the United States 21–22 (2006); Neuman, supra note 5, at 21–23, 31–37. 
 187. Among the reasons the federal government did not assert exclusive control over migra-
tion before the Civil War was that this power would have implied the ability to control the 
transportation of slaves and to preempt state laws that regulated the entry of free blacks. 
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Court imposed its first limitation in the Passenger Cases of 1842, striking 
down laws in Massachusetts and New York that levied fees on arriving im-
migrant passengers to offset the cost of caring for foreign paupers.188 The 
five justices in the majority could not agree on a rationale, however.189 Some 
considered the state laws to be unconstitutional regulations of foreign com-
merce and others viewed them as taxes on imports in violation of Article I, 
Section 10 of the Constitution.190 The notion that the states had some author-
ity concurrent with the federal government’s over commerce-related matters 
that intersected migration remained alive for a few decades,191 largely be-
cause a strong statement regarding the federal government’s control over the 
migration of people among the states would have suggested federal author-
ity to regulate (and perhaps prohibit) the domestic slave trade. 
By the 1870s, with the slavery issue essentially settled by the Civil War 
and Reconstruction amendments, the doctrine of federal exclusivity began to 
take shape, taking off on the Commerce Clause grounds articulated by the 
plurality in the Passenger Cases.192 In Henderson v. Mayor of New York,193 
the Court struck down New York and Louisiana laws that required shipmas-
ters to pay fees or post bonds to indemnify states if immigrants ended up on 
public assistance, on the ground that the laws interfered with Congress’s 
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. And in Chy Lung v. 
Freeman,194 the Court struck down a California law that gave inspectors dis-
cretion to deny entry of immigrants (namely Chinese) absent payment of 
some kind, on the ground that the law interfered with the federal govern-
ment’s efforts to conduct its foreign affairs.195 But even after it decided these 
cases, the Court continued to recognize the states’ police authority to adopt 
inspection and quarantine laws, and states continued to enforce their own 
public health laws and to help enforce the new federal immigration laws that 
Congress had passed in the 1880s.196  
The foundation of the current federal exclusivity principle, therefore, did 
not solidify until the Court decided Chae Chan Ping v. United States and 
                                                                                                                      
 188. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 447–50, 453 (1849). 
 189. Cf. Legomsky, supra note 185, at 190 (noting that four of the Justices in these cases 
were unwilling to recognize a federal power to exclude aliens, demonstrating that it was not clear 
that the framers intended to assign immigration power exclusively to the federal government).  
 190. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 453. 
 191. Note that in The Passenger Cases, the majority appeared sympathetic to the states’ inter-
ests, and every justice agreed that states retained some power to regulate immigration. Justice Grier, 
for example, wrote that the “sacred law of self-defence” justified the states excluding “lunatics, 
idiots, criminals, or paupers” as well as free blacks. Id. 457. As Gerald Neuman has noted, many 
states still required bonds in place of the automatic head taxes struck down by the Court. Neuman, 
supra note 5, at 23–30. 
 192. See The Passenger Cases, 48. U.S. (7 How.) at 393–464. 
 193. 92 U.S. 259 (1876). 
 194. 92 U.S. 275 (1876). 
 195. For a more extended discussion of these cases, see Motomura, supra note 186, at 23–
24, and Neuman, supra note 5, at 48–49. 
 196. Motomura, supra note 186, at 24; see Neuman, supra note 5, at 49. 
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Fong Yue Ting v. United States, in 1889 and 1893, respectively.197 These two 
decisions affirmed the constitutionality of complex federal regulatory 
schemes that provided for the exclusion and deportation of Chinese laborers. 
In these cases, the Court announced the so-called plenary power doctrine, 
which holds that the government has plenary power over immigration ad-
missions and removals (virtually unrestrained by the Constitution), and that 
this power is exclusively federal.  
A mountain of scholarly commentary exists critiquing the so-called ple-
nary power,198 and its plenary nature has eroded over time, as the Supreme 
Court has interpreted due process protections and other constitutional provi-
sions to apply to federal procedures governing the removal of noncitizens.199 
Indeed, this aspect of the doctrine is arguably now no more than a theory of 
judicial review over immigration decisions, where courts police process, but 
substance is considered a political question. But the focus of almost all of 
this critique and modification has been on the absence or weakness of con-
stitutional limitations on the federal government’s admissions and removal 
laws, or on the claim that due process and equal protection should apply to 
most if not all of the government’s actions in the immigration sphere. Sub-
stantially less work has been done challenging the federal exclusivity prong 
of the plenary power doctrine,200 and the notion of federal exclusivity, as a 
doctrinal matter, has only strengthened over time, largely because of an un-
derstandable reluctance to unleash the discriminatory powers of the states 
on immigrants.201 But the reality of migration management today demands 
that we reconsider the doctrinal foundations of the federal exclusivity prin-
ciple, and ask: does the presumption of exclusivity persist for good reason?  
In Chae Chan Ping, Justice Field connects immigration control to the 
pursuit of foreign affairs and national security, the protection of which 
represents “the highest duty of every nation” and trumps all other con-
                                                                                                                      
 197. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 
130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 198. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congres-
sional Power, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 255; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of 
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale L.J. 545 
(1990); Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judi-
cial and Executive Branch Decision Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 3; Peter H. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Peter J. Spiro, Ex-
plaining the End of the Plenary Power, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 339, 341 (2002).  
 199. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (interpreting detention pending re-
moval provision to include a six-month limitation in order to avoid the possibility of indefinite 
detention); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 23 (1982) (holding that a lawful permanent resident 
seeking readmission was entitled to due process protections); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 
(1903) (holding that noncitizens subject to deportation are entitled to fair procedures). For a discus-
sion of this erosion, see Motomura, supra note 186, at 108–13. 
 200. Peter Schuck also has made this point recently. Schuck, supra note 11, at 58–59. 
 201. For a strong argument against state and local participation in immigration enforcement 
on civil rights grounds, see Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration 
Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1102–15 (2004) (discussing the threat of racial profiling by state 
and local enforcement); Wishnie, supra note 8, at 526 (discussing the danger of devolving federal 
authority because such devolution might compromise the equal protection rights of immigrants). 
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cerns.202 Defending national security, in Field’s view, requires repelling en-
croachments of any kind, including the encroachments of the “vast hordes” 
of other nation’s peoples on the United States—hordes that come not just in 
the form of invading armies, but also of immigrants.203 Justice Field thus 
characterizes immigration as related to two interests thought to be quintes-
sentially national in scope: foreign affairs concerns, because immigration 
involves the United States’ interaction with citizens of other sovereign 
states, and national security, largely for the same reasons.204 Exclusive fed-
eral control is therefore necessary to ensure that foreign affairs and national 
security policy are uniform. On immigration and like issues, the “American 
people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling 
and managing their interests in all these respects is the government of the 
Union.”205  
The federalism component of the plenary power doctrine is thus based 
on an external conception of sovereignty that emphasizes the power and 
status of the nation-state as one among many in an international world. Jus-
tice Field does not point to any particular provision of the Constitution 
enumerating the federal power to control immigration, nor does he cite 
Henderson v. New York for the proposition that Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce includes the power to regulate migration.206 Instead, 
Justice Field describes the power over immigration as a function or “inci-
dent” of the United States’ sovereignty in and of itself.207 This external, 
unenumerated conception of sovereignty, “delegated in trust to the United 
States,” endows the government with the right to exercise its immigration 
power “at any time when, in the judgment of the government, the interests 
of the country require it”; in other words, without restraint.208  
Without a doubt, immigration regulation continues to implicate the 
United States’ relations with foreign powers. In the early months of 2007, 
for example, the intersection between foreign policy and immigration ap-
peared in mainstream news cycles. The connection has been highlighted by 
the debate over how many and through what processes Iraqi refugees should 
                                                                                                                      
 202. 130 U.S. at 606. 
 203. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606. 
 204. Id. at 606–10. 
 205. Id. at 604 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 413–14 (1821)).  
 206. Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 405 (5th ed. 
2006). 
 207. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 603–04. For a critique of this theory of sovereignty as a 
source of the immigration power, see Legomsky, supra note 198, at 184–87 (arguing that an exter-
nal conception of sovereignty is inconsistent with the theory of enumerated powers and that it 
cannot be justified as a necessity today because of the scope of the modern Commerce Clause). 
 208. Id. at 604, 609 (“While . . . the great mass of local matters is controlled by local authori-
ties, the United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects . . . are one nation, 
invested with powers which . . . can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence 
and security throughout its entire territory.”); see also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
U.S. Constitution (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the relative authority of the executive, Congress, and 
courts in managing U.S. foreign affairs). 
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be settled in the United States,209 as well as by the growing distress in  
Mexico and other Latin American countries over the United States’ failure to 
adopt an immigration reform that would eschew wall building in favor of 
freer legal migration across the U.S. southern border.210 But the continued 
intersection between immigration and foreign affairs does not lead inexora-
bly to federal exclusivity for at least two reasons.  
First, it is no longer clear that it is possible or even desirable to exclude 
states and localities from activities that implicate foreign affairs. Peter Spiro, 
who has encouraged scholars and advocates to “learn to live with immigra-
tion federalism,” has made a convincing case that the foreign affairs 
underpinnings of the plenary power no longer make sense.211 Spiro empha-
sizes that states and localities today “enjoy international personality” and 
have “routine dealings with foreign governments (both national and subna-
tional).”212 Many of these dealings do not, of course, interfere with the 
federal government’s foreign affairs objectives, and as such would not be 
preempted under a dormant foreign affairs theory. But the fact that states 
regularly engage in economic and cultural exchanges with foreign powers 
and their subentities underscores for Spiro that the rationale behind foreign 
affairs preemption—that when states act, foreign powers will blame and 
retaliate against the national government because they will not be able to 
identify the states as actors—no longer describes the knowledge horizons of 
foreign governments.213  
This move is of a piece with a growing body of legal scholarship that de-
scribes and defends the ways in which state and local governments engage  
in foreign policy or do business with inevitable implications for foreign af-
fairs. Judith Resnik, for example, has explored the “law’s migration,” or the 
proliferation of local action aimed at “bypassing the nation-state to make 
transnational precepts local law.”214 The conditions of globalization “changed 
the definition of what constitutes ‘local issues,’ ” motivating local  
                                                                                                                      
 209. See, e.g., George Packer, Betrayed: The Iraqi translators who helped America, New 
Yorker, Mar. 26, 2007, at 52. 
 210. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., From Mexico Also, the Message to Bush Is Immigra-
tion, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2007, at A12 (“At nearly every turn, the American president has been 
faced with anger over what is perceived as the United States’ neglect of the region and frustration 
with its tougher border-security policies in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks.”). 
 211. See Spiro, supra note 8. 
 212. Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration Law in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 Va. 
J. Int’l L. 121, 153, 161 (1995). 
 213. Id. at 162–63. Spiro points out that the Court has begun to retreat from the one-voice 
requirement in foreign Commerce Clause and foreign affairs preemption cases. Id. at 164. In  
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298 (1994), the Court upheld a California 
taxation scheme that has a disparate impact on multinational corporations on the ground that the law 
was not preempted by federal tax law, moving the doctrine away from broad-based foreign affairs 
preemption arguments and into the framework of standard domestic preemption analysis. See id. at 
163–65. Spiro also emphasizes that in the controversy over Proposition 187, it was clear to the gov-
ernment of Mexico that California, and not the federal government, was behind the measure. In 
response, the Mexican government boycotted a trade exhibition in California and citizens in Tijuana 
organized a two-day boycott of San Diego businesses. Id. at 165–66. 
 214. Resnik, supra note 34, at 1634. 
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governments to become involved in broad-ranging debates on matters global 
in scope,215 such as climate change and, I would add, the attraction and set-
tlement of migrants.216 For better or worse, states and localities are 
interacting with international entities and legal processes in norm-generating 
ways that diverge from and may ultimately influence federal policy.217 Con-
gress may still have reason to shape immigration policy to address foreign 
affairs concerns in ways that preempt state law. But the foreign affairs ra-
tionale no longer supports exclusive federal control, particularly in the wake 
of increased state and local involvement in external matters.218  
Second, and more to the point, though the national security and foreign 
affairs dimensions of immigration are inescapable, immigration is neither 
exclusively nor primarily a national security or foreign relations issue. The 
justification for greater state and local participation in immigration regula-
tion stems from the fact that transnational phenomena are increasingly 
bearing down on states and localities in ways that a single, central govern-
ment may not be best suited or able to manage.219 Immigration has direct 
implications for state and local institutions and their fiscal well-being, as 
well as for the public health, safety, and welfare of the communities that 
state and local entities govern. In other words, immigration is not just about 
the United States’ relationship with the world and the definition of national 
sovereignty; immigration implicates the definition of localized political 
communities as well as divergent local interests in the pace and scope of 
integration and social change.  
What is more, the developments discussed in Part II render the assump-
tion that the United States must speak with one voice on immigration an 
anachronism. In fact, public discourse on immigration must involve multiple 
voices. Attempts to sustain a persistent national conversation on immigra-
tion law and policy are not only excruciating but also destroy precisely the 
value such nationalization is meant to advance: unity. The difficulty of pass-
ing immigration reform—the fact that major reforms happen only every ten 
to twenty years—highlights that, as a nation, we are not capable of sustain-
                                                                                                                      
 215. Id. at 1644 (quoting William B. Stafford, Globally Competitive Regions: What 
Seattle is Learning from the Rest of the World 1 (1999)). 
 216. For direct overlap between foreign affairs issues and local government resolution draft-
ing, see supra Section II.B.3, which describes the origins of the sanctuary movement in the foreign 
policy context. 
 217. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 34, at 1639–43 (discussing efforts by local governments and 
states to secure the ratification of the Convention to End Discrimination Against Women, most of 
which are hortatory calls to the federal government to ratify the treaty, but some of which include 
efforts by local governments to implement precepts of the treaties into their own laws). 
 218. See id. at 1647 (discussing participation by state and local officials in national and inter-
national organizations, such as the National League of Cities, the United States Conference of 
Mayors, the National Governors’ Association, and the National Commissioners on Uniform State 
Law, as “conduits for border crossings, state to state and internationally”). 
 219. Cf. id. at 1653 (noting that the climate programs adopted by mayors who support the 
Kyoto Protocol “collapse the global into the local, turning problems that could have been dealt with 
as foreign policy by the national level . . . into domestic policies about how cities run themselves”). 
RODRIGUEZ FINAL TYPE MR.DOC 1/7/2008 8:32 AM 
February 2008] The Significance of the Local 617 
 
ing the immigration conversation for very long.220 The complexity of the 
issue demands supple and sometimes contradictory responses, and a one-
voice approach is likely to produce both over- and underinclusive policies. 
These risks may be present when it comes to a wide variety of issues, but 
they are particularly salient in the immigration debate, which is always un-
comfortably proximate to a deep nativist strain in American culture.  
In the end, we need not indiscriminately fear local participation and 
variation in the evolution of immigration law and policy. As scholars have 
recognized in other contexts, we should see local governments as playing an 
important role in the development of American constitutional identity and in 
negotiating the potentially explosive consequences of nascent civil rights 
and social movements.221 Local participation in matters thought to be of na-
tional significance can have generative effects, helping to resolve issues 
incrementally in the absence of national consensus, and therefore protecting 
the varied interests of parties who have yet to see their way to national con-
sensus.222 Against this normative defense of local variation, it is not enough 
to say that the absence of a federal solution itself reflects a national consen-
sus because issues are likely to be salient for some parts of the country 
earlier and more frequently than for others. In other words, the “one voice” 
rationale for the federal exclusivity principle sets too high a decision-
making hurdle on the immigration issue, whose manifestations are extraor-
dinarily varied, and whose practical consequences local communities must 
face every day.  
B. Toward a New Power-Sharing Theory  
Recognizing immigration as a state and local concern would not dis-
place federal authority to regulate in the area, nor would it be mutually 
exclusive with the recognition that the federal government should either 
occupy significant stretches of the immigration field or exert strong leader-
ship in certain areas. Taking account of the multi-sovereign regime would 
only challenge the federal exclusivity conclusion. Once we accept that the 
appropriate structural relationship between the states and the federal gov-
ernment is more complicated than exclusivity admits or that state 
                                                                                                                      
 220. As a structural matter, it is difficult for the federal government to come to consensus on 
immigration-related questions. Indeed, the immigration debate provides us with an acute version of 
“Madison’s nightmare.” See Hills, supra note 10, at 10 (defining “Madison’s nightmare” as a situa-
tion where “heterogeneity of interests could prevent the majority coalition from doing anything at 
all—even just and useful things—while simultaneously facilitating the ability of self-interested 
minorities to loot the federal fisc”). 
 221. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Consti-
tution, 115 Yale L.J. 2218, 2221 (2006) (examining San Francisco’s challenge to California’s same-
sex marriage ban and arguing against the conventional view that cities’ interpretations of the Consti-
tution should be considered suspect and that cities have no independent role in constitutional 
interpretation). 
 222. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745, 1783, 
1749 (2005) (noting that “federalism can be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing 
would-be dissenters to govern in some subpart of a system,” which in turn contributes to the mar-
ketplace of ideas, and facilitates self-government and self-expression). 
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participation in immigration regulation is not constitutionally preempted, 
the question becomes: how should we conceptualize the distribution of 
power between the federal, state, and local governments in this area?  
1. Division of Labor 
It may be tempting to hang on to something of the federal exclusivity 
principle and try to separate immigration control and integration policy. We 
could think in terms of a division of labor among the levels of government. 
The federal government handles admissions, removals, and enforcement, 
and states and localities can choose different methods of integrating immi-
grants admitted by the federal government.  
But this division is conceptually unstable, if not incoherent. As Part II 
makes clear, because immigration control and immigrant integration mutu-
ally reinforce one another, it can be quite difficult to separate control 
measures from integration measures once we move beyond the obvious 
cases of setting visa policy on the one hand and providing affirmative inte-
gration assistance to legal immigrants on the other. The difficulty of this 
conceptual separation already bedevils constitutional law, where doctrines 
attempt to distinguish between immigration law, which deals with the com-
ings and goings of migrants, and alienage law, which is concerned with how 
immigrants are treated once they arrive. But as a number of scholars have 
noted,223 this line has been impossible for courts to draw clearly. Alienage 
classifications shade into immigration controls because policies that dole out 
relatively negative or positive treatment to immigrants will inevitably induce 
immigrants to move across state (and possibly national) borders. It thus will 
be impossible to police the line between integration and control without dis-
placing a great deal of important state and local regulation targeted at 
integration.  
The concern for integration as a function of immigration control was al-
ready apparent in Henderson.224 The Court, in addition to finding that a state 
immigration regulation burdened foreign commerce, noted also that the state 
law interfered with federal policy, acknowledging that “immigrants . . . 
come among us to find a welcome and a home,” bringing with them “the 
labor which we need to till our soil, build our railroads, and develop the la-
tent resources of the country in its minerals, its manufactures, and its 
agriculture.”225 Contained within the terms of immigration control is control 
over the terms of the relationship between immigrants and the body politic. 
The Court most explicitly conflates integration and control in Graham v. 
Richardson and Mathews v. Diaz, the 1970s Court decisions that helped so-
lidify the federal exclusivity principle. In Graham, the Court ties questions 
                                                                                                                      
 223. E.g., Huntington, supra note 11 (manuscript at 9) (“The categories of immigration law 
and alienage law are not perspicuous.”); Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry, supra note 8, at 526 
(noting that the alienage/immigration distinction is not dispositive). 
 224. Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1876). 
 225. Id. at 270. 
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of integration (the relationship of the individual to the state) to the power to 
decide who can and cannot enter.226 In Mathews, the Court notes, “[t]he de-
cision to share [our] bounty with our guests may take into account the 
character of the relationship between the alien and this country: Congress 
may decide that as the alien’s tie grows stronger, so does the strength of his 
claim to an equal share of that munificence.”227 Graham in particular de-
mands of the state seeking to withdraw public benefits from noncitizens a 
justification linked to national interests or citizenship—a justification the 
state cannot possibly give. The Court is thus suggesting that the status and 
treatment of immigrants are matters of national identity and national citizen-
ship.228  
There are good reasons for the Court to advance this assumption, 
namely the nationalization of citizenship by the Fourteenth Amendment229 
and the interest in enabling freedom of travel within the boundaries of the 
United States—an interest justifiable in rights and citizenship terms230 as 
well as in commerce-promotion practical terms. But this analysis simply 
emphasizes that the line between immigration control and immigrant inte-
gration can be difficult to draw, particularly if we conceive of citizenship as 
a legal status and therefore a national construction.  
To the extent that we think states should have freedom to devise immi-
grant integration policies that suit their present conditions and histories, 
creating a doctrinal distinction between immigration control and integration 
policy will not be of great use. Some states will be more parsimonious than 
the federal government. And some state and local communities’ desires to 
integrate a population that is de facto present, even if not de jure present, 
may run counter to federal objectives. To enable states and localities to  
                                                                                                                      
 226. 403 U.S. 365, 376–80 (1971) (striking down an Arizona law that made noncitizens eligi-
ble for welfare only if they had lived in the United States for fifteen years, on grounds that the law 
violated equal protection and exceeded state authority).  
 227. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
 228. Cf. Motomura, supra note 186, at 82–83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Matthews v. Diaz and the distinct federal and state roles in constructing citizenship through welfare 
policy). 
 229. Recognition of freedom to travel, of course, predates the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849). The Passenger Cases court noted,  
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, 
with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the 
same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without inter-
ruption, as freely as in our own States. 
Id. 
 230. Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (striking down a California law that imposed a 
one-year residency requirement on receipt of certain public benefits, on grounds that the law inter-
fered with the right to travel, a privilege and immunity of citizenship); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (striking down a state statute limiting welfare benefits to those who have re-
sided in state for a year or more, observing that “[t]his Court long ago recognized that the nature of 
our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citi-
zens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land”). 
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perform the integration work essential to the management of migration, 
then, we need a theory of power sharing.  
2. Preemption and Judicial Restraint 
Devising a power-sharing framework requires immigration preemption 
analysis to be normalized. Courts must jettison the obfuscating overlay of 
the exclusivity principle and treat immigration regulation as subject to the 
standard Supremacy Clause preemption inquiry. There is no reason to fear 
that abandoning exclusivity will compromise federal power over immigra-
tion; general, albeit contested, doctrines exist to manage the federal-state 
relationship and to ensure that state and local laws do not thwart the federal 
government’s ability to implement or enforce its laws. Abandoning exclusiv-
ity instead would bring precision to the doctrinal assessment of state and 
local immigration regulations and shift the focus of the debate over state and 
local participation in a productive direction, toward debates over the extent 
to which Congress should preempt state and local activity that impinges on 
immigration-related matters.  
Courts, without saying so, have moved in this direction over the years. 
Federal exclusivity is really more bark than bite. Courts often begin their 
analysis with strong statements of exclusivity but then strike down state 
laws on a conflict-preemption basis.231 The fact that the federal government 
has regulated so comprehensively in the immigration field means that a 
statutory basis for preemption is not difficult to find, and so few, if any, liti-
gation outcomes hinge on a constitutional holding. Indeed, courts typically 
rely on the preemption framework as articulated by the Supreme Court in 
De Canas v. Bica, which resembles a standard preemption inquiry: has the 
federal government occupied the field, and if not, does state law nonetheless 
present an obstacle to the achievement of the federal objective or frustrate 
the purposes of the federal scheme? And, as the Court made clear in De  
Canas when it upheld a California statute penalizing employers who hired 
unauthorized immigrants, “[not] every state enactment which in any way 
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted 
by [the federal government’s] power, whether latent or exercised.”232 Though 
                                                                                                                      
 231. E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941) (striking down a state law after finding 
that it could not be enforced given the existing federal statutory scheme for alien registration and 
noting that state law in this area “is restricted to the narrowest of limits”); League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1253–56 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (applying statutory preemp-
tion principles to find that California’s Proposition 187 conflicts with federal law after noting that 
“the ‘[p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.’ ” (quoting De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354, 356 (1976)); Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 
601, 607 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing De Canas for the proposition that immigration regulation is a fed-
eral power while rejecting broad field preemption theory, noting that “Congress’ failure to act in this 
regard has not ousted states’ authority to regulate in this area; instead, it is clear that Congress has 
left the states to decide for themselves whether or not to admit illegal aliens into their public post-
secondary institutions”).  
 232. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355. 
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the Court seemed to recognize the possibility of constitutional preemption,233 
it also contemplated state authority to issue immigration-related regulations 
consistent with federal law.  
But the availability of constitutional preemption, and its statutory corol-
lary of field preemption, leads courts to define conflict between state and 
federal laws broadly and to put a thumb on the scale in favor of preemption. 
Because it has become so enmeshed in the courts’ doctrinal rhetoric, exclu-
sivity has given rise to very strong versions of obstacle and field preemption 
according to which states are not regarded as having meaningful interests in 
controlling immigration. In offering this thumb-on-the-scale theory of 
courts’ preemption analysis, I echo then-Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opin-
ion in Toll v. Moreno,234 a case in which the Court struck down a Maryland 
statute defining different college tuition rates for differently situated aliens. 
The Court found that because the federal government had admitted a certain 
class of aliens to the United States and afforded the aliens significant tax 
exemptions, the Court could not conclude that Congress ever contemplated a 
state imposing discriminatory tuition charges solely on the basis of the fed-
eral alienage classification.235 But as Justice Rehnquist contends in dissent, 
the Court interferes in an area of traditional state autonomy based on specu-
lative conclusions about the effects of federal tax treaties and without any 
direct evidence that Congress intended to supplant the type of regulation in 
which Maryland was engaged.236 
This tendency to over-read congressional objectives is evident in the dis-
trict court decision striking down the Hazleton ordinance. In conducting its 
implied conflict preemption analysis of the ordinance’s employment provi-
sions (after finding the provisions expressly preempted and field preempted 
                                                                                                                      
 233. Id. at 356 (“Even when the Constitution does not itself commit exclusive power to regu-
late a particular field to the Federal Government, there are situations in which state regulation, 
although harmonious with federal regulation, must nevertheless be invalidated under the Supremacy 
Clause.”). The court went on to note that  
we will not presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state authority to 
regulate the employment relationship . . . in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws. 
Only a demonstration that complete ouster of state power—including state power to promul-
gate laws not in conflict with federal laws—was “ ‘the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ 
would justify that conclusion.’ ” 
Id. at 357. 
 234. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 235. Toll, 458 U.S. 1. 
 236. Id. at 25–27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist does acknowledge that “federal power 
over immigration . . . is plenary and exclusive,” but he rejects the extension of that idea to cover 
regulations of aliens once they have been admitted, apparently limiting the idea of exclusive immi-
gration control to admissions decisions. Id. at 26. For further evidence of these distortions, see Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Hines struck down a Pennsylvania law, requiring aliens over 
eighteen years old to register with the state, on conflict preemption grounds, while implying that 
concurrent authority does not exist. The Court observed that “[l]egal imposition of distinct, unusual 
and extraordinary burdens . . . upon aliens . . . bears an inseparable relationship to [foreign affairs].” 
Id. at 62–65. In dissent, Justice Stone noted that even if Congress could constitutionally establish an 
exclusive program for alien registration, “it has not done so and . . . it is not the province of the 
courts to do that which Congress has failed to do.” Id. at 75 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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by IRCA),237 the court emphasizes that IRCA “leaves no room for state regu-
lation,” that immigration is a “national issue,” and that allowing states to 
legislate with regard to employment of unauthorized workers would inter-
fere with congressional objectives.238 But the court adverts to no strong 
evidence that the Hazleton ordinance actually prevents the federal govern-
ment from enforcing IRCA. Instead, the court emphasizes two weaker forms 
of conflict.  
The court first points to differences in the details of the regulatory 
schemes, noting, for example, that IRCA requires employers to verify work-
ers’ status themselves, whereas the Hazleton ordinance requires employers 
to send workers’ papers to a municipal office, where an official determines, 
in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), 
whether the worker is unlawful under federal law. With this move, the court 
defines an arguably irrelevant procedural difference as a conflict. It then 
emphasizes that the differences in detail between the two schemes demon-
strate that Hazleton and Congress have struck a different balance between 
the two goals of protecting the rights of workers and businesses and prevent-
ing illegal immigration, with Hazleton presumably placing more emphasis 
on the latter, at the expense of the federal government’s emphasis on the 
former. The court thus treats a speculative and general tension between the 
two schemes as an actual conflict, reaching a conclusion that ultimately 
sounds in field more than conflict preemption. With each of these moves, 
the court reinforces the assumption that immigration is a federal domain, 
even absent demonstrable conflict.239  
But what would it mean for courts to apply standard preemption doc-
trine?240 Their analysis may initially be muddy, if only because the 
                                                                                                                      
 237. For an in-depth doctrinal analysis of the express and field preemption claims against the 
employment provisions of the IIRA’s, see Cristina M. Rodríguez et al, The Legality of State 
and Local Immigration Measures 8–20  (2007), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2007).  
 238. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 523 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 239. See id. at 530. This capacious view of the federal interest in immigration control is ar-
guably reflected in other doctrinal areas, as well. For example, the Court’s decision in Hoffman 
Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), in which the Court held that the NLRB’s deci-
sion to award back pay to unlawfully discharged unauthorized workers was counter to the goals of 
IRCA, arguably reflects an overprioritization of Congress’s objective of preventing the employment 
of the unauthorized over the goal of preventing unfair labor practices. 
 240. Relaxing preemption doctrines would not free states and localities to have their way with 
immigrants and immigration. As the Valley Park lawsuit has made clear, some forms of state and 
local immigration regulation conflict with generally applicable state law (in that case, with Missouri 
landlord tenant law). See Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, No. 4:06CV01487-EWR, 2006 WL 
3331082 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2006). As Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), makes clear, 
the Equal Protection Clause may constrain states from adopting measures that discriminate against 
immigrants. Of course, the Court has drawn exceptions to the Graham rule, holding that states 
sometimes can impose restraints on aliens and exclude aliens from certain state benefits, namely 
certain public employment opportunities. See Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a 
state law requiring noncitizen public school teachers to declare intent to naturalize); Sugarman v. 
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (“We recognize a State’s interest in establishing its own form of 
government, and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within ‘the basic 
conception of a political community.’ ” (quoting Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972))). 
Another way to think about this issue is to consider the possibility that the federal government might 
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overarching question of whether Congress has intended to oust state powers 
is not a question that makes a lot of sense to courts in the immigration con-
text, given that immigration control has not been explicitly recognized as a 
state power. “Ordinary” preemption doctrine, moreover, is itself something 
of a contested hash. But in broad outlines, accepting my account of concur-
rent authority would mean recognizing that states and localities have 
legitimate interests in immigration regulation, which in turn would require 
courts to abandon robust field preemption and malleable frustration of pur-
pose obstacle preemption, both of which elide legitimate state interests and 
assume Congress intends to regulate broadly. To be sure, Congress has been 
legislating for over a century against a backdrop of federal exclusivity, and 
so this assumption is not without foundation. But it is time to require more 
specificity and discipline from Congress and the courts alike in this area. 
a. Field Preemption 
Leaving aside the relatively clear-cut case of express preemption, which 
nonetheless raises interpretive difficulties (as the employer sanctions, in-
state tuition, and noncooperation law debates underscore), courts in an im-
migration case would begin with a field preemption inquiry. Normalizing 
the inquiry in this area would require courts to define the relevant field 
without resort to the jargon of exclusivity. Given that courts have “grown 
increasingly hesitant”241 to read implicit field preemption into statutes in 
general, applying standard preemption doctrine in the immigration context 
is ultimately likely to result in a move away from field preemption.  
Of course, Congress has legislated expansively in the immigration area, 
and so courts will generally confront a regulatory regime that they might 
easily deem “so pervasive” that “Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”242 But the analysis in Part II demonstrates the importance of 
keeping the definition of fields narrow—to avoid displacing altogether le-
gitimate state interests in passing regulations that affect immigrants who 
have entered the country, including regulations that may affect immigrant 
movement. Defining a field that does not cut too wide a swath through the 
territory of state and local regulation I have outlined would mean defining 
the field of regulation with some specificity.243 “Immigration” is a capacious 
                                                                                                                      
authorize states to draw distinctions in their distribution of welfare and other benefits, if the federal 
government determines that such variation is an appropriate way to manage the relationship of im-
migrants to the body politic. This view would accept the basic premise of Graham that the federal 
government should be driving the train, but would recognize the functional analysis I offer here. 
 241. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 227 (2000). 
 242. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).  
 243. As Caleb Nelson has pointed out, “[t]he Court has grown increasingly hesitant to read 
implicit field preemption clauses into federal statutes.” Nelson, supra note 241, at 227; cf. Florida 
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145 (1963) (upholding a California standard for 
avocado maturity and defining the field of federal superintendence as avocado maturity for purposes 
of introduction of Florida fruit into interstate commerce, and not all interstate shipment of avoca-
dos).  
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term that consists of many subsets, and delineating those subsets precisely is 
the only way to ensure that state interests are not trampled.  
The district court’s invalidation of the Hazleton landlord regulations ar-
guably reflects a misuse of field preemption. The court explicitly invalidates 
the ordinances on conflict preemption grounds, but its holding is based on the 
presumption that Hazleton intends the housing ordinance as a mechanism of 
removal, or to force unlawful immigrants out of the United States.244 The fact 
that the federal government has set exclusive standards for who has a right to 
remain and sometimes permits unlawful immigrants to stay—which in turn 
means that a proceeding before a federal immigration judge is the only official 
means of determining whether an alien may be removed—justifies the court’s 
invalidation of the ordinance. In other words, it is Congress’s occupation of 
the field of status determinations that preempts Hazleton’s efforts to regulate 
landlords.  
But actual removal is at best an ancillary consequence of the landlord 
ordinances. The ordinances set up no removal procedures or even any re-
quirements that landlords report unlawful immigrants to ICE, and no 
evidence is offered to show that those affected by the statute are not just 
moving to another town or state. The court is thus using a legitimate claim 
of federal field occupation—the field of status determinations—to reach 
state regulation clearly outside that field. Indeed, the court’s holding is ar-
guably inconsistent with De Canas v. Bica.245 There, the Court upheld a 
California employer sanctions scheme that penalized employers for hiring 
unauthorized workers246—a scheme that could have had the same conse-
quences of forcing aliens to leave the country. Despite the fact that the 
federal government had constructed an enforcement scheme of its own (that 
at the time did not include employer sanctions), state measures that related 
to state interests, such as the regulation of the terms of employment, re-
mained valid.247 As Justice Rehnquist explains in his dissent in Toll, De 
Canas rejects the idea that the federal government’s immigration power “ei-
ther unexercised” or in existing law “preempts the field of regulations 
affecting aliens once federal authorities have admitted them into this coun-
try.”248 Federal power may be exclusive over whom to admit and remove, but 
this power does not extend to cover every manner of enforcement-related 
activity that might induce voluntary departure by immigrants. 
b. Conflict Preemption 
In conducting conflict preemption analysis, the goal in the immigration 
context, as in preemption generally, should be pursuit of neutrality, or per-
                                                                                                                      
 244. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 527–29 (M.D. Pa. 2007). 
 245. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
 246. Id. at 355–56. 
 247. Id. at 356–57. 
 248. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, at 26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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forming an analysis that favors neither the state nor the federal interest in 
regulation, but instead determines whether the state law genuinely interferes 
with the effectuation of federal law. Some scholars suggest that courts 
should require Congress to adopt a clear statement of its intent to preempt. 
Others have suggested that a finding of conflict should be made only if it 
would be physically impossible to comply with the federal and state statutes 
at issue.249  
Whereas the former places too high a burden on Congress—it is unreal-
istic to expect Congress to anticipate every situation in which state laws 
might undermine its efforts to regulate—the latter is effectively a thumb-on-
the-scale in favor of the states, as impossibility may well be itself impossi-
ble to demonstrate. It is not surprising, then, that impossibility preemption is 
a “vanishingly narrow” area.250 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a state law that 
would make it impossible for ICE to enforce the immigration laws, and ap-
plying a strict impossibility test would be tantamount to giving states carte 
blanche to thwart federal regulatory objectives.  
If impossibility need not be shown, then the next inquiry is whether the 
state law presents an obstacle to the enforcement of the federal scheme. 
Scholars have criticized the sort of obstacle preemption used in some immi-
gration cases.251 According to the skeptical point of view, the fact that a state 
law’s practical effects might obstruct certain broad federal purposes, such as 
controlling the flow of illegal immigrants, does not mean that the state law 
is invalid.252 This conclusion follows, in part, because assessing those effects 
requires speculation and, in part, because a preemption doctrine that is un-
derstood to cover this sort of tension between the effects of state laws and 
federal purposes would subsume a wide swath of state legislation, particu-
larly if a court defines the federal interest at a high level of generality. 
Instead, the touchstone for conflict analysis should be whether the state 
measure unduly interferes with an existing federal regulatory scheme, such 
that it makes the effective implementation of that scheme substantially more 
costly or inefficient than it would be absent the state regulation. Focusing on 
the federal government’s ability to superintend an area it has chosen to regu-
late means focusing on outcomes, not on vaguely defined notions of 
purpose. This approach would require courts to identify an actual conflict, 
as opposed to a general incompatibility, before preempting a state law.253  
                                                                                                                      
 249. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). For a discus-
sion of the various scholarly views on the subject, see Nelson, supra note 241, at 229–31. 
 250. Nelson, supra note 241, at 228. 
 251. Caleb Nelson has argued that “constitutional law has no place for the Court’s fuzzier 
notions of ‘obstacle’ preemption.” Id. at 231. 
 252. See id. at 231–32 (noting that the mere fact that federal law serves a purpose does not 
mean that it contradicts all state laws that get in its way). 
 253. For an example of this sort of approach, see Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, 
Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding award of workers’ compensation to an unauthor-
ized alien post-Hoffman Plastic and noting that “[t]he mere fact of ‘tension’ between federal and 
state law is generally not enough to establish an obstacle supporting preemption, particularly when 
the state law involves the exercise of traditional police power” and “only where the repugnance or 
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How might these principles be applied to some of the federalism contro-
versies of today? The principles would justify state laws that advance the 
same objectives as federal laws with means that do not thwart (or are not 
inconsistent with) the processes of federal enforcement.254 This approach 
makes the preemption question fact dependent. With respect to the laws that 
would deny employers who knowingly hire unlawful workers business li-
censes or contracts, if the state adopts federal standards for who is unlawful, 
such laws would not appear to frustrate the federal scheme at first glance.255 
Assuming these schemes depend on states or employers using the federal 
government’s E-Verify program to verify status, however, if a high volume 
of state and local requests would become overly burdensome for the system, 
or if a high error rate were to result, then perhaps the mechanisms chosen by 
the states to enforce their schemes could be said to be interfering with the 
ability of the federal government to enforce its own regulations.256 A similar 
analysis could be applied to the landlord ordinances, as well as to state laws 
that require proof of citizenship or eligibility for public benefits. In other 
words, whether the means chosen by a state to pursue ends consistent with 
those set out in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) will thwart 
federal regulation will depend on the particularities of the state law and the 
current state of the federal bureaucracy. A court attempting to decide this 
question might look to statements by federal officials, or consider expert 
witness testimony.257 Short of an official policy statement from DHS em-
bodying empirical data, it will be impossible to eliminate the courts’ need to 
speculate about the potential conflict. But by eschewing the malleable frus-
                                                                                                                      
conflict is so direct and positive that the two acts cannot ‘be reconciled or consistently stand to-
gether’ ” should preemption be found). The many cases decided by state courts upholding workers’ 
compensation awards to unauthorized immigrants emphasize the traditional and important state 
interest in regulating the terms of employment—an emphasis I argue should be permitted in the 
direct immigration context as well. 
 254. Peter Schuck calls for a test according to which state laws “mirror” or “mimic” federal 
laws. Schuck, supra note 11, at 80, 84–85. 
 255. The district court in Lozano v. Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), saw this 
differently, holding that not only must a decision to deny a business license be based on a finding 
that an employer has hired an unlawful immigrant as defined by federal law, it must be based also 
on a preexisting federal determination of that violation. Id. at 518–21. This holding is consistent 
with (though not explicitly supported by) legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 
(1986) (“[Penalties] are not intended to preempt . . . state or local processes concerning . . . a license 
to any person who has been found to have violated the sanctions provisions . . . .”), but not with the 
text of the statute, which does not expressly limit states’ use of their licensing powers to instances 
where federal sanctions have been imposed.  Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 523–24. For a detailed 
discussion of this issue, see Rodríguez et al, supra note 237, at 8–20. 
 256. Given that the federal government seeks broad participation in its E-Verify program, it 
seems unlikely that this conflict actually would occur. That said, a state law that requires employers 
to enroll in E-Verify may well disrupt the federal scheme by making a program mandatory that the 
federal government intended to be voluntary and experimental. Cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 
529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (finding state tort suit seeking to establish a duty to install airbags was 
preempted by DOT regulation making adoption of air bags voluntary, on the grounds that the agency 
sought “a gradually developing mix of alternative passive restraint devices”). 
 257. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federali-
zation of Tort Law, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 227, 242 (2007) (discussing the recent trend of courts 
looking to federal agencies for data to determine whether uniform federal rules are appropriate). 
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tration of purpose approach in favor of an outcome-oriented inquiry, this 
speculation can be kept in check. 
With respect to the question of state and local police participation in law 
enforcement, rejecting constitutional exclusivity would mean accepting that 
states and localities are not constitutionally barred from enforcing immigra-
tion laws.258 But as a matter of statutory preemption, it seems clear that the 
federal government has contemplated and expressly defined the route for 
states to follow: the 287(g) agreement and the explicit authorization of state 
and local police enforcement of the criminal smuggling and reentry provi-
sions of the INA. Any other attempts at immigration enforcement that are 
not ancillary to standard law enforcement or otherwise expressly authorized 
by federal law arguably have been preempted based on Congress’s determi-
nation that the federal government should supervise state participation in 
this area. The legality of the measures that would require police to verify the 
status of those who come into their custody might depend on what follows 
from officers’ attempts at verification.259 As with the employer sanctions 
provision, if the state and local requests for status verification overtax the 
system by which these determinations are made, or result in a high error 
rate, thus compromising efficient and effective enforcement of immigration 
law, then a conflict preemption argument could be made.  
As for the state and local policies arguably inconsistent with the federal 
goal of preventing illegal immigration—the day labor centers, the identifica-
tion authorization laws, the noncooperation provisions, and the in-state 
tuition provisions—a preemption approach that eschews frustration of pur-
pose would require more than an inconsistency with the federal objective of 
enforcing immigration law to find these measures invalid (absent express 
preemption, which arguably exists in the latter two cases). At the very least, 
those challenging such laws should be required to provide evidence or rea-
soned argument that the measures thwart the ability of the federal 
government to enforce its laws. 260  
                                                                                                                      
 258. See supra note 104. 
 259. For a discussion of these measures, see supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text.  
 260. Whether local policies lead immigrants to illegally enter is an empirical question. I am 
not aware of any evidence other than of the anecdotal variety demonstrating cross-border movement 
as a result of local policies. My intuition is that workers move for jobs, not in response to accom-
modationist policies. The fact that there are large numbers of unauthorized immigrants in localities 
that do not adopt accommodationist measures suggests that day labor centers and the like do more to 
ameliorate hardship than induce movement. But we would expect policies that assist in the process 
of locating employers and that make life as an unlawful immigrant easier to manage will make some 
immigrants more likely to take the risk of living illegally in the United States. It is also likely that 
unauthorized workers are more willing to risk living illegally in communities that help them find 
work and provide other means of integration. Absent empirical study, it is probably safe to assume 
that the integrationist policies I describe are not causing the unlawful immigration problem, but that 
they may affect how unlawful immigrants sort themselves out in the United States and may also lead 
to some marginal increase in unlawful immigration. But we do face a chicken and egg problem here: 
are there a lot of unlawful immigrants in New York because the city is a hospitable place for them, 
or has the city become a hospitable place for them because the unlawful population is sizable as a 
result of the city’s need for immigrant labor?  
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For example, though a day labor site might indirectly facilitate illegal 
immigration by enhancing unauthorized workers’ ability to secure employ-
ment, public funding of such a site does not prevent the federal government 
from enforcing immigration laws, nor does it attempt to regulate directly 
who can and cannot enter the country. With respect to the sanctuary laws, 
because Congress under the Printz commandeering doctrine cannot compel 
state governments to assist in enforcing federal law, it would be hard 
pressed to make the claim that the mere existence of the noncooperation 
laws conflicts with the general purpose of regulating and enforcing immi-
gration laws, particularly if those laws only prohibit city officials from 
inquiring into immigration status, as opposed to forbidding information 
sharing with federal authorities. 
c. Beyond Preemption 
Abandoning the exclusivity principle would have potentially radical im-
plications in doctrinal contexts beyond preemption. First, the exclusivity 
principle has had an important influence on the development of equal pro-
tection doctrine as it applies to noncitizens. Putting the principle aside 
would cure the much-lamented inconsistency in that area of the law—that 
whereas state distinctions between citizens and noncitizens are subject to 
strict scrutiny, such distinctions drawn by the federal government are subject 
only to rational basis review. In Mathews v. Diaz,261 federal exclusivity is 
arguably doing a significant amount of work below the surface of the opin-
ion in justifying the relaxed standard of review in the alienage context. The 
notion that federal alienage classifications are inherently rational, whereas 
state classifications might not be, is hard to explain without the backdrop of 
federal exclusivity, given that no other federal power is treated in the same 
way.  
This assumption is also present in opinions such as Justice Kennedy’s 
decision in Nguyen v. INS.262 Though Justice Kennedy purports to be apply-
ing intermediate review to the gender classification present in the derivative 
citizenship law being challenged, Justice O’Connor rightly eviscerates the 
Court’s reasoning in the case as wholly inconsistent with the Court’s gender 
equal protection cases.263 Though Justice Kennedy claims not to address 
whether the plenary power should continue to modify the scrutiny given to 
                                                                                                                      
 261. 426 U.S. 67, 84–85 (1976). The court notes that  
[S]tate statutes that deny welfare benefits to resident aliens . . . encroach upon the exclusive 
federal power over the entrance and residence of aliens. . . . [This] ground of decision actually 
supports our holding today that it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment, rather than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the conditions 
of entry and residence of aliens. The equal protection analysis also involves significantly dif-
ferent considerations because it concerns the relationship between the aliens and the States 
rather than between aliens and the Federal Government. 
Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)). 
 262. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 263. Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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the federal government’s classifications, it is difficult to accept his equal 
protection analysis without a suspicion that the special context of immigra-
tion is influencing the outcome.264  
If we understood the immigration power like all other federal powers—
if we normalized it—it would become conceptually incoherent to hold the 
federal government to a different standard than the states. The fear that shift-
ing to a regime where states and the federal government are held to the same 
standard would mean diluting equal protection scrutiny of state laws is mis-
guided, however.265 In a world without federal exclusivity, federal alienage 
distinctions would lose their presumptive rationality, but the reasons for 
treating aliens as a suspect class would remain the same: aliens are outside 
the political process and cannot protect their interests, yet they pay taxes and 
are members of our society—factors that exist as much in the federal con-
text as in the state context. The difference that justifies the disparate 
standards today is that the federal government has a special relationship to 
and routinely deals with alienage classifications—a function of federal ex-
clusivity. To be sure, the nature of the federal interest in an alienage 
distinction may well be different from a state’s interest,266 given the federal 
government’s primary and pervasive involvement in immigration regulation. 
But that difference would be reflected properly in the articulation of com-
pelling interests justifying alienage classifications, not in the decision about 
which standard of review to apply. 
The second radical doctrinal implication of my shift in approach is that 
it would bring the Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez267 into the pic-
ture, arguably requiring Congress to limit the extent to which it regulates 
certain aspects of the immigration field. If we were to treat the immigration 
power like the commerce power, then the former would not justify regulat-
ing every matter conceivably connected to the core of the power—
controlling who crosses our borders. In a world without exclusivity, Con-
                                                                                                                      
 264. For a discussion of the covert work being done by the plenary power in Kennedy’s opin-
ion, see Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to Professor 
Spiro, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 835 (2002). 
 265. Cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding state and federal 
government to the same standards with respect to racial classifications and maintaining the strict 
scrutiny standard articulated in Croson v. Virginia). 
 266. An additional implication of my analysis is that Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
may also have been wrongly decided. In Graham, the Court dismissed the state’s interest in protect-
ing the public fisc as a compelling justification for its welfare restrictions, in part based on the 
default assumption that states have no interest in regulating immigration—that the relationship 
between noncitizens and the state is a function of the federal immigration power. Concluding that 
the states have a compelling interest in mediating the effects of immigration on their population may 
justify upholding more alienage distinctions than would be permitted under Graham as it now 
stands. But in reality, this result would not stack the deck against immigrants any more than it is 
now. This form of equal protection scrutiny has proven to be of limited value in protecting the inter-
ests of noncitizens; fears of races to the bottom have not materialized in instances in which 
Congress has devolved authority to the states to draw alienage distinctions, see infra Section III.B.3; 
and strict scrutiny does not apply to unlawful immigrants, who are the subject of much state legisla-
tion, in any case.  
 267. 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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gress’s act forbidding states to make in-state tuition benefits available to 
unlawful aliens would look like blatant overreaching into the prerogatives of 
the states to administer their own institutions, as would Congress’s 1996 
requirement that states wanting to provide benefits to unauthorized immi-
grants had to enact new laws to that effect after 1996. To connect a state’s 
decision to make public benefits available to unauthorized immigrants to the 
control of movement in and out of the United States would be regarded as 
engaging in the kind of piling of “inference upon inference” that the Court 
has rejected in its recent federalism decisions.  
Of course, applying Lopez in the immigration context ultimately may 
not have far-reaching doctrinal implications. Even if Lopez were to apply, 
immigration, unlike education, is not primarily or traditionally a realm of 
state concern—an important dimension of the Lopez holding.268 In addition, 
in light of Gonzalez v. Raich,269 the Rehnquist-O’Connor revolution arguably 
has run its course. It could be argued that in-state tuition rules and the like 
are components of an integrated regulatory scheme, in the vein of Raich. 
Rules governing the rights and benefits to which immigrants can claim enti-
tlement represent considered, though perhaps marginal, components of a 
larger regulatory structure designed to control immigrant movement.  
That said, Lopez federalism still represents a judicial articulation of a 
larger political principle: Congress should recognize the limits of its own 
powers and thus restrain itself from interfering with or thwarting state regu-
lation or decision-making. Abandoning the exclusivity principle in the 
immigration context would mean that federalism-based limitations on Con-
gress’s power to regulate aliens could be articulated and therefore invoked to 
justify some congressionally applied restraints on federal regulation of non-
citizens. The state interest in immigration need not be reframed as a 
traditional state concern to advance the claim that states have immigration-
related interests that congressional overregulation often elides and some-
times tramples.  
3. Preemption and Lawmaking 
The doctrinal reorientations outlined above might lead some cases to 
come out differently, but the comprehensiveness of federal regulation in this 
area makes conflict preemption relatively easy to establish, and courts will 
resist limiting the federal power to regulate immigration and immigrants. In-
stead, the more significant shift I am advocating is a conceptual one that 
would support a new structural framework for congressional decision-making. 
The functional understanding of state and local immigration regulation sup-
ports the advancement of new lawmaking norms that emphasize two 
strategies: congressional restraint and cooperative federalism. This conceptual 
aspiration reflects what Roderick Hills has described as the proper under-
standing of federalism, according to which “the benefits of federalism in the 
                                                                                                                      
 268. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565–67. 
 269. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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present and in the future will rest on how the federal and state governments 
interact, not in how they act in isolation from each other.”270  
a. Restraint 
The federal exclusivity principle can be used as a club against state and 
local activity, including integration-related policies,271 not just by courts, but 
also in lawmaking. The principle abets an aggressive assertion of congres-
sional authority in the immigration area, establishing a presumption of 
federal primacy that then pervades policy discourse, which emphasizes that 
Congress can and should step in to preempt explicitly state and local poli-
cies that diverge from Congress’s overarching objectives. Though such 
legislative action may be appropriate as a matter of constitutional authority, 
it flattens out the contradictions that I emphasize in Parts I and II we must 
tolerate to absorb immigrants effectively. 
Instead of jumping to preempt or occupy territory, Congress should 
adopt a presumption against preemption, or direct prohibition of state au-
thority in this area. Whereas such a presumption is arguably inappropriate 
when applied by courts because it favors the state interest over the federal, 
requiring the federal government to anticipate every conceivable conflict 
through express preemption provisions,272 it would be appropriate for Con-
gress to think twice before preempting state laws. Congress should refrain 
not only from preempting state actions in areas that might seem to be in ten-
sion with federal objectives, but also from requiring state and local officials to 
participate in immigration enforcement activities, either directly (which would 
raise commandeering issues) or indirectly, through Spending Clause–type 
incentives. The presumption should have particular purchase when measures 
through which states and localities are working to secure the trust and integra-
tion of immigrant communities are at issue. In other words, Congress should 
recognize the states’ interest in adopting a range of integration measures that 
help states and local communities deal with the practical and human  
implications of immigration. These interests will include responding to unau-
thorized immigration and will require the federal government to tolerate a 
certain amount of deviation from federal baselines when determining how 
much immigration-related territory to occupy.  
                                                                                                                      
 270. Hills, supra note 10, at 4. 
 271. Compare Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 538 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (holding 
that an ordinance which requires proof of legal citizenship or residency to obtain an occupancy 
permit violated due process), with Second Amended Bill of Complaint for Declaratory and Injunc-
tive Relief, at 17–18, Karunakaram v. Town of Herndon, Chancery No. 2005-4013, 2006 WL 
408389 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 10, 2006) (arguing that the city’s decision to fund a day labor site frus-
trates the purposes of the Federal Immigration Regulation and Control Act).  
 272. Caleb Nelson makes a strong claim that this presumption, according to which courts seek 
narrowing constructions of federal statutes to avoid preempting state law, is misguided. Nelson, 
supra note 241, at 232. He argues that the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante clause through which 
the Framers directed courts not to apply traditional presumptions against implied repeals. Id. But see 
Hills, supra note 10, at 5. 
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The INA already reflects this willingness by letting states use their li-
censing authority to penalize employers who hire the unauthorized and in 
giving states authority to provide benefits to the unauthorized above and 
beyond what federal law permits.273 At the same time, Congress repeatedly 
has stepped in to preempt state measures with integrative designs.274 Mem-
bers of Congress also have tried unsuccessfully to preempt day labor 
centers,275 and proposals to make law enforcement and other sorts of funding 
contingent on states and cities assisting federal immigration enforcement 
appear in public debates, most recently in an amendment to a homeland se-
curity funding bill276 and a campaign promise by Republican presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney.277  
In claiming that these forms of preemption should be resisted, I am not 
arguing that Congress can never conclude that such state and local efforts 
interfere with national interests. Rather, my claim is that Congress’s delib-
erations on these issues should be informed by awareness of the ways in 
which the states’ interests diverge from its own, and of the need for that di-
vergence in light of the difficulties of managing migration. 
b. Cooperation 
In addition to resisting preemption, Congress should actively promote 
power-sharing or cooperative activity between state and local officials and 
the federal government. A model for federal-state consultation can be found 
in the Canadian system, where the federal and provincial governments have 
concurrent jurisdiction over immigration policy.278 Though Canada’s federal 
government has exclusive jurisdiction over naturalization, and the provinces 
cannot obstruct immigrant travel among the provinces, the British North 
America Act gives the provinces the power to “make Laws in relation to . . . 
Immigration into the Province,” insofar as those laws “are not repugnant” to 
                                                                                                                      
 273. See 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) (2005) (“A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully 
present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien 
would otherwise be ineligible under subsection (a) . . . only through the enactment of a State 
law . . . .”). 
 274. See, e.g., id. § 1623(a) (limiting state authority to charge in-state tuition at public col-
leges); id. § 1373(a) (prohibiting certain local noncooperation laws).  
 275. During the 2007 comprehensive immigration reform debate, Johnny Isakson, senator 
from Georgia, introduced the so-called Home Depot amendment, which would have prohibited state 
and local laws that required home improvement stores to provide shelter for day laborers—a meas-
ure the Los Angeles City Council has considered but has not yet passed. Home Depot Amendment, 
N.Y. Times, June 22, 2007, at A20.  
 276. Press Release, Immigration Reform Caucus, House Passes Drake Amendment to Eradi-
cate Sanctuary Cities (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ 
ca50_bilbray/morenews/drakeamend.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 277. Michael D. Shear & Dan Balz, Romney, Giuliani Escalate Their Immigration Fight, 
Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 2007, at A02. 
 278. Julius Grey, Immigration Law in Canada 5 (1984); see also Kevin Tessier, Immigra-
tion and the Crisis in Federalism: A Comparison of the United States and Canada, 3 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 211 (1995). 
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any act of Parliament.279 To negotiate the potential for conflict in this ar-
rangement, Parliament passed an Immigration Act in 1976, which it later 
amended in 2001, to create a framework for federal-provincial cooperation. 
The Act authorizes the federal government to consult and enter into agree-
ments with the provincial governments on immigration and refugee policy, 
in order to capture the particular and varied effects of immigration on the 
different regions of the country.280 But not only does the Act permit coopera-
tion generally, it also requires specific forms of cooperation. The federal 
government must consult the provinces on the subject of the number of im-
migrants to be admitted each year in the various categories set by law.281 The 
purpose of this requirement is to ensure that the federal government takes 
into account regional economic and demographic needs and considers pro-
vincial views when contemplating what measures should be adopted to 
“facilitate [immigrants’] integration into Canadian society.”282 In other 
words, though Parliament remains supreme, the provinces have an explicit 
role in the constitutional structure to help manage “immigrant settlement” in 
response to “regional demographic requirements,” to which the provinces 
are presumably best attuned.283 
To be sure, a coherent immigration system must begin by assuming pri-
mary federal control over admissions limits and removal standards, largely 
because such control performs a critical coordinating function. The one-
voice argument, at least from the perspective of efficiency, still has purchase 
in this context: the system would be chaotic if individual states could set 
visa limits and create their own standards for removal. In the United States, 
this centralization has made direct enforcement of federal immigration stan-
dards extraordinarily complex, because the federal government has adopted 
intricate admissions and visa standards over time. Centralization thus sup-
ports tight congressional control over state-federal enforcement 
collaboration through mechanisms such as 287(g).284  
                                                                                                                      
 279. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 95 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5, 
§ 95 (Appendix 1985). 
 280. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 1–2.5 (Can.). Section 10 of the 
Act provides that  
(1) The Minister may consult with the governments of the provinces on immigration and refu-
gee protection policies and programs, in order to facilitate cooperation and to take into 
consideration the effects that the implementation of this Act may have on the provinces. (2) 
The Minister must consult with the governments of the provinces respecting the number of 
foreign nationals in each class who will become permanent residents each year, their distribu-
tion in Canada taking into account regional economic and demographic requirements, and the 
measures to be undertaken to facilitate their integration into Canadian society.  
Id. § 10(1)–(2). 
 281. Id. at § 10(2). 
 282. Id.  
 283. It of course must be noted that this arrangement reflects and facilitates Quebec’s unique 
role within the Canadian federation, a role for which there is no equivalent in the United States. 
 284. See, e.g., Professor Stephen Yale-Loehr Testimony at 111:8–139:25, Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06cv1586) (noting the wide variety of lawful 
statuses recognized by the federal government and the numerous ways in which unlawful immi-
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But cooperation should nonetheless be possible. As I have shown 
throughout this Article, the federal government depends on the states to 
manage migration, but the federal exclusivity principle blocks efforts to lev-
erage this relationship because it supports the assumption that the power 
Congress would cede in these cooperative ventures is exclusively federal 
and therefore not capable of being devolved. But cooperation can provide 
states with an avenue to deal directly with the consequences of immigration 
that clearly implicate state interests, while providing a form of federal su-
pervision that creates an extra check to ensure that a state’s action is not 
motivated by animus, or is consistent with federal objectives.  
The cooperation I envision could take several forms. First, Congress 
could expressly authorize states to adopt measures that state officials might 
otherwise worry are outside their power or that are politically unpalatable 
without some cover from Congress, as with the DREAM Act. Similarly, 
Congress could devolve authority to states to exercise decision-making ca-
pacity in areas that might otherwise be off limits to the states under current 
law, such as state implementation of federally funded programs like Medi-
caid.285 The touchstone for congressional policymaking in this area should 
be not whether Congress is authorizing states and localities to do positive or 
negative things vis-à-vis immigrants, but whether the policy enhances or 
shuts down state decision-making capacity over how best to approach im-
migrant populations and whether the policy ultimately balances the 
competing goals of the system. 
In its most productive form, cooperation would involve enlisting the 
states in immigration-related policy, as Congress already has with the 287(g) 
agreements.286 Though Governor Vilsack’s “immigrant enterprise zones” 
never got going in Iowa, his plan could serve as a model for direct state in-
volvement in setting labor admissions standards.287 States could provide 
their relative preferences and expertise directly to an administrative policy 
process, rather than indirectly through representation in the Congresses that 
                                                                                                                      
grants are permitted to adjust status, which produces lag time in the process of transitioning from 
unlawful to lawful status).  
 285. See Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding a Colorado 
restriction on welfare coverage authorized but not mandated by state law, noting that “a state’s exer-
cise of discretion can also effectuate national policy”); but see Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, 754 
N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that federal authorization cannot insulate state law from strict 
scrutiny review). 
 286. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 916 (1997) (citing Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 
22 Stat. 214 (1882)). The court took note of a federal law that enlisted state officials  
“to take charge of the local affairs of immigration in the ports within such State, and to provide 
for the support and relief of such immigrants therein landing as may fall into distress or need 
of public aid”; to inspect arriving immigrants and exclude any person found to be a “convict, 
lunatic, idiot,” or indigent; and to send convicts back to their country of origin “without com-
pensation,” [but on a voluntary basis by empowering the Secretary of the Treasury] “to enter 
into contracts with such State . . . officers as may be designated for that purpose by the gover-
nor of any State”. 
Id. (omission in original). 
 287. For recent academic advocacy of this type of arrangement, see Schuck, supra note 11, at 
68–71. 
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set visa limits. This form of collaboration would involve state governments 
and bureaucrats, who are likely to have expertise related to the challenges 
facing state governments that is quite distinct from the expertise of their 
state’s federal delegates. 
It may be the case that some of these cooperative ventures will prove to 
be misguided. It is possible that the states will not act as faithful agents of 
the federal government.288 Little is known, for example, about how the 
287(g) agreements are functioning. Because state and local police are far 
more likely to come into contact with individuals through quotidian interac-
tions, such as traffic stops, the possibility of racial profiling of Latinos and 
mistaken identity rises substantially with state and local involvement. More-
over, as police chiefs around the country have cautioned, state and local 
engagement in immigration enforcement may seriously undermine the con-
fidence and trust of immigrant communities in law enforcement.289 At the 
same time, anecdotal evidence suggests that federal-state-local collaboration 
in this area helps to restrain state and local enforcement that may occur in an 
ad hoc manner anyway. Because public pressure to crack down on criminal 
aliens, in particular, is powerful, federal-state-local law enforcement part-
nerships may help restore public confidence in law enforcement while 
ensuring that state and local enforcement efforts are overseen by the federal 
government.290  
Because cooperation has the potential to produce a variety of benefits, it 
should be pursued. As the regulatory trends discussed in Part II make clear, 
states have a strong interest in federal success when it comes to enforce-
ment, and so cooperation may well enhance federal capacities. In addition, 
in the face of federal inaction and resource constraints, states can act as a 
kind of clean-up crew for the federal government.291 Of course, some of 
these states may be more invested in successful enforcement than the federal 
government, which has an arguable interest in underenforcement. But coop-
eration would not diminish the federal government’s discretion with respect 
to whether to pursue removal of an unlawful alien apprehended by a state 
official. And when it comes to immigrant admissions, some states may seek 
more immigrants with different statuses than the federal government. But 
presumably a collaborative admissions-setting process would enable the 
federal government to develop both a more accurate assessment of the labor 
                                                                                                                      
 288. See American Intergovernmental Relations (Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. ed., 4th ed. 
2007). If the federal government responds to this possibility by focusing on administrative as op-
posed to political partnerships, then the expressive and democratic value of federal-state cooperation 
will be lost, though the efficiency and expertise value may still be served. 
 289. See, e.g., Letter from Charlie T. Deane, Chief of Police, Prince William County, Va. to 
Craig S. Gerhart, County Executive 3 (July 10, 2007) (on file with author). 
 290. See, e.g., David Alire Garcia, Close Enough: Police policy on immigrant arrests nears 
completion, Santa Fe Rep., at 8 (Sept. 19, 2007) (describing the city’s compromise policy on noti-
fying ICE about apprehension of aliens suspected of identity theft, violent crime, drug trafficking, 
and gang activity). 
 291. For a discussion of the “Madison’s nightmare” problem, see Hills, supra note 10, at 10–12. 
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market, as well as a clearer picture of how much immigration particular 
pockets of the country are willing to tolerate.  
State immigration-related action also might serve as a catalyst for fed-
eral reform by heightening awareness of crucial issues that might not enter 
the federal government’s purview otherwise. That is, a legislative trend in 
the states might pressure the federal government to address an issue that has 
become national in scope or to revisit a law that clearly buts up against 
states’ judgments with respect to integration policy. States, through their 
regulatory efforts, also can help make the federal government aware of the 
costs of the latter’s policies, thus helping to set the agenda for federal reform 
by bringing notoriety and perhaps infamy to an issue.292  
The current and accelerating trend of state and local regulation in the en-
forcement vein, for example, is highlighting to federal lawmakers the need 
to reconsider their policy of underenforcement, which has resulted in 
stepped-up enforcement and may eventually produce more comprehensive 
reform.293 The same dynamic is at work with the in-state tuition issue. De-
spite the federal government’s attempt in 1996 to prevent states from 
making in-state tuition rates available to unauthorized students, several 
states persisted in creating this option, making clear to the federal govern-
ment the importance of the measure for long-term integration objectives. 
The appeal of the in-state tuition measure may yet lead Congress to pass the 
DREAM Act, which would not only authorize what states are already doing, 
but also take the crucial next step of giving certain unauthorized students 
legal status—a move that only the federal government can make.  
In the end, the flattening tendency of exclusive federal regulation lends 
credence to the belief that we must have a national or uniform policy on 
matters concerning the regulation and status of immigrants in this country. 
The principle also prevents us from effectively channeling the powerful ten-
dency toward decentralized decision making and thus from exploring the 
potential benefits of federal-state-local cooperation. Federal exclusivity in 
the lawmaking context must therefore be set aside as well. 
4. Preemption and the City 
Though a number of scholars have engaged the federal-state preemption 
question in the immigration context, few if any have addressed the relation-
ship between states and cities.294 In part because immigration federalism has 
been off the conceptual table for so long, this particular relationship is not 
                                                                                                                      
 292. See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1500–38 (2007) (discussing state environmental initia-
tives, their potential to spark interest-group lobbying for federal reform, and the possibility that 
some states intend to provoke federal action). 
 293. Cf. Spiro, supra note 8, at 1630 (discussing the steam-valve effect). 
 294. Scholarly work on state preemption of local laws is developing. E.g., Clayton P. Gillette 
& Leila K. Thompson, Pre-empting Interest Groups: Conflicts Between State Statutes and Local 
Ordinances (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (characterizing the preemption question as 
a matter of institutional design concerning the best forum for resolution of particular issues).  
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well thought out. But state preemption of local law is even more effective in 
flattening out diverse preferences than the immigration preemption some-
times employed by courts, because state preemption is not constrained by 
functional parallels to the constitutional doctrines that protect states’ inter-
ests, particularly as I have reformulated them. What is more, the line 
between measures that resemble immigration control and measures that 
simply have an impact on immigrants (which limits immigration preemption 
in the federal-state relationship) is not available to police the state-locality 
relationship. After all, as scholars of local government law point out, cities 
do not have independent constitutional status and “can exercise power only 
within the legal frameworks that others have created for them,”295 or within 
frameworks created by the states in which they are located. 
But throughout this Article, I have emphasized the role not only of states 
but also of localities in absorbing the effects of immigration. Indeed, local 
governments truly man the frontlines when it comes to absorbing migratory 
flows: cities are primary agents of integration because they run the schools, 
hospitals, and other institutions through which integration occurs. But sub-
entities within states will want to manage immigration differently; within a 
single state, one locality might adopt an IIRA, and another might pass a 
sanctuary law. Of course, in some instances, cities might exert considerable 
power over state processes. Statehouses are likely to avoid preventing their 
large metropolitan centers from taking steps to attract immigrants and facili-
tate their integration, regardless of legal status. But among the laws 
considered and enacted by the newly active states are those that would pre-
empt certain forms of local action on immigration-related matters, 
particularly the noncooperation provisions.  
At the end of the day, the functional account I have offered depends on 
the autonomy not just of states but also of cities. But an antipreemption 
norm at the state level may favor cities over small towns, in that it frees cit-
ies to take steps to attract immigrants in ways that will have collateral 
consequences for towns that might prefer to keep their immigrant popula-
tion small or nonexistent. But an antipreemption norm nonetheless opens up 
the possibility of intrastate diversity, which is essential to the integrated, 
three-tiered framework I have argued the immigration issue requires. How 
to foster this antipreemption norm to mediate the state-local relationship is 
less apparent than in the federal-state relationship. It might be appropriate in 
some circumstances for the federal government to immunize localities from 
the power of their states, or at least to facilitate state-local cooperation by 
giving states incentives to provide localities with room to maneuver, perhaps 
through funding to assist in managing immigration-related costs. The point 
ultimately to recognize at this stage is the value of the antipreemption norm 
in the state-local context. 
                                                                                                                      
 295. Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 Urb. Law. 
1 (2006). 
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C. Confronting Externalities and the Value of Interstate Competition 
If courts, lawmakers, and scholars were to reorient their understanding 
of immigration preemption along the lines I describe, we immediately 
would confront the possibility that states and localities might impose exter-
nalities on their neighbors. Cities and towns that adopt policies facilitating 
integration, thereby attracting immigrants to their communities, inevitably 
produce spillover effects on surrounding areas: immigrants attracted to New 
York City, for example, may well create networks that become part of larger 
metropolitan areas with impacts on the northern suburbs and Long Island. 
Even more acutely, when ordinances push immigrants and related parties 
out of their communities, they force immigrants onto other cities and states. 
The IIRAs, for example, have motivated (or forced) immigrants out of towns 
such as Hazleton and presumably to other U.S. communities (and perhaps to 
the immigrants’ home countries).296  
As the Court’s analysis in Graham v. Richardson makes clear, however, 
an important aspect of the federal exclusivity principle is that it helps ensure 
that all states bear the burden of immigration evenly, or that no one state can 
force the consequences of immigration onto another—a peculiar argument, 
to be sure, given that immigrants do not distribute themselves evenly across 
the country. Still, the construct is that the federal government, by setting 
admissions policies and enforcement priorities, determines who can enter 
and remain in the United States, and states and localities are therefore pre-
cluded from adopting their own policies to control immigrant movement. 
Add to this assumption the cases that have recognized a right to travel 
within the United States,297 and the corresponding norm in favor of freedom 
of movement within the territories of nation-states, and the destructive po-
tential of regulations designed to prevent immigrants from entering 
particular communities becomes clear.  
Though this externality problem would not arise, at least as a legal prob-
lem, in cases in which state and local action has been authorized or 
facilitated by federal policy (though federal policy could and does impose 
disproportionate burdens on some states), the possibility of such state-to-
state burden-shifting provides strong support for doctrines that promote fed-
erally generated uniformity in certain areas.298 Indeed, one way to 
conceptualize state regulation of immigration is through a kind of “dormant 
immigration power” analysis parallel to the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trines that protect interstate commerce from certain burdens imposed by 
                                                                                                                      
 296. See Jose Lechuga Testimony at 124:3–135:21, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 
2d 477 (2007) (No. 3:06cv1586) (noting that the city ordinance generated a climate of intolerance 
against Latinos, which prompted both legal and illegal immigrants to leave town); see also Michael 
Rubinkam, Grocer: Pa. Town’s Laws Scared Customers, Mar. 13, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
WireStory?id=2946425&page=1)(last visited Nov. 2, 2007)(“Lechuga . . . testified that his grocery 
store once attracted customers from throughout northeastern Pennsylvania. After the immigrant 
measures were approved, he said, customers stayed away, intimidated by a police car often parked 
nearby.”). 
 297. E.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 298. Cf. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 12, at 1368–69.  
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state regulation.299 That said, policing state laws that impose such burdens on 
other states or on interstate commerce has proven to be a fraught enterprise, 
given the shaky textual foundations of the dormant Commerce Clause and 
the highly integrated nature of our economy.300 But even assuming such cost-
shifting should be policed as a general matter, the argument for federal uni-
formity in the immigration context dissolves under close scrutiny. 
Immigrants are different in kind from the paradigmatic externality ex-
ample of pollution, largely because the presence of (even unauthorized) 
immigrants may be welcomed (or at least tolerated) in some communities 
but not in others. There is thus a strong argument that immigration is itself a 
good (in contrast to pollution, which is the inherently negative byproduct of 
processes that advance a good). It follows that the processes of absorbing 
this good into the body politic may ultimately benefit from a bit of regula-
tory competition or from population sorting in which immigrants settle in 
welcoming communities. Such competition might make for better integra-
tion in the long run: immigrants, like citizens, will sort themselves out, 
settling where they are more likely to fit in and be welcomed into public 
institutions.  
What is more, preempting local laws that aim to exclude immigrants 
will not make for a better integration environment, because the sentiments 
behind the preempted ordinances are likely to remain and fester. As I sug-
gest in Part II, whatever is motivating the IIRAs—whether it is a fit of 
pique, fear of cultural change, or genuine concern about lawlessness—that 
motivation is likely to give way over time to acceptance. But this transition 
from fear to acceptance is more likely to occur not only if the local debate 
over immigration is permitted to run its course (subject to generally applica-
ble laws), but also if the localities that adopt these ordinances come to feel 
the consequences of excluding immigrants from their communities—
namely, the economic consequences of pushing immigrants out of places 
they helped revitalize. 
Given the nature of the immigrant-as-externality, then, the assumption 
that state measures designed to control immigrant movement conflict with 
and undermine federal admissions and enforcement decisions must be based 
on the fear that state regulation will promote a race to the bottom. When the 
IIRAs passed by towns in Pennsylvania force immigrants to Ohio, perhaps 
Ohio will respond to this “burden” by passing laws designed to discourage 
illegal immigrants from seeking housing and employment in that state—
measures that inevitably will affect legal immigrants, as well, by creating 
                                                                                                                      
 299. Erin F. Delaney, Note, In the Shadow of Article I: Applying a Dormant Commerce 
Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007). 
 300. For a critique of the dormant Commerce Clause along these lines, see Tyler Pipe Indus. 
v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 261 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he language 
of the Commerce Clause gives no indication of exclusivity. . . . Now that we know interstate com-
merce embraces such activities as growing wheat for home consumption . . . it is more difficult to 
imagine what state activity would survive an exclusive Commerce Clause than to imagine what 
would be precluded.”). 
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climates hostile to immigrants generally. 301 This race eventually will result 
in the de facto expulsion of immigrants from the United States, despite the 
federal government’s determination that immigrants are entitled to remain 
here.  
But it seems clear that we can afford some regulatory competition in this 
area, for a variety of reasons. First, given the size and diversity of the United 
States, there is no reason to believe that most jurisdictions will feel impelled 
to follow the lead of towns such as Hazleton. Indeed, as many localities 
have passed “pro-immigrant” measures as have passed IIRAs. Though a 
number of these measures are hortatory, they suggest that many localities 
are prepared to absorb immigrant populations, whether for economic or 
ideological reasons.302 This prediction is reinforced by the events that fol-
lowed the 1996 immigration reforms, when the predicted race-to-the-bottom 
to deny immigrants all forms of public services did not occur.303  
The difficulty, of course, is that allowing measures like the IIRAs to stay 
on the books would effectively declare certain communities off limits to 
immigrants. This consequence interferes with the right to travel noted 
above304 and recalls the poor laws of the nineteenth century, through which 
states limited the movement of the poor across state borders.305 But once we 
understand the IIRAs in broader perspective and couple that understanding 
with an awareness of the limitations of the right to travel argument—that 
most of the states’ social welfare policies will affect citizens and noncitizens 
alike—then the limitations that restrictive local ordinances impose on non-
citizens’ mobility seem like a less glaring concern. 
Conclusion 
Immigration is a federal issue. Controlling the admission of immigrants 
implicates core functions of the national sovereign. Controlling who crosses 
its borders is an act of both self-definition and security-promotion for a na-
tion-state. Managing migration requires strong federal leadership, and 
                                                                                                                      
 301. For a discussion of these effects and testimonial evidence that the Hazleton ordinance 
has contributed to a climate of discrimination and anxiety for Latinos generally, see All Things Con-
sidered: Hazleton’s Immigration Law Brings Suspicions (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 16, 2007). 
 302. See, e.g., supra Section II.B; see also Miriam Jordan, Bourbon, Baseball Bats and Now 
the Bantu, Wall St. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at B1 (quoting Mayor of Louisville Jerry Abramson as say-
ing “[c]ommunities that embrace diversity are going to be the most successful” and noting that the 
mayor “avoids distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants”). 
 303. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 8, at 389 (observing that expected race to the bottom did 
not occur in 1996); see also Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking 
the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 
(1992) (challenging the conventional wisdom that assumes races to the bottom are always predict-
able when regulation is left to the states in the environmental area). 
 304. I am reluctant also to dismiss the right to travel claim on alienage grounds, in part be-
cause it seems as though once the federal government has admitted someone, that person should be 
able to move freely within U.S. territory. (In my view, the unauthorized immigration issue raises an 
easier constitutional question but an equally difficult moral question.) 
 305. See Motomura, supra note 186, at 129. 
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uniform rules governing who may enter and who forfeits the right to remain 
are crucial for administrative efficiency and to sustain an integrated national 
economy.  
But immigration regulation is not a zero-sum game. Questions of who 
should belong to a political community, and who should be allowed to cross 
borders, are also both global and local in scope. In the immigration context, 
the form of sovereignty that is understood to control as a matter of doctrine 
comes from sources external to our Constitution and is connected to a con-
ception of the nation-state as one among many in an international world. But 
immigration also implicates the sovereignty of organized political communi-
ties—sovereignty that emanates not from international law, but from the 
people who comprise the nation-state. It is time to inject conceptions of 
popular sovereignty into the discourse on immigration regulation, or to cap-
ture in our immigration federalism doctrine the basic idea that those affected 
by immigration controls must have a say in the design and implementation 
of those controls, which will require including not only the residents of 
states and localities but also the voices of immigrants themselves.306  
If we consider the rise of state and local immigration regulation from a 
functional perspective, it becomes clear that a de facto multi-sovereign re-
gime that captures these various interests has emerged in practice, 
demonstrating that the federal government cannot manage contemporary 
migration on its own. Instead, strong local institutions and local power have 
become necessary—both to integrate immigrants into the body politic and to 
manage the human and social consequences of a federal immigration policy 
full of contradictions. States and localities, through their efforts to manage 
migration, are thus contributing to the process of defining the political and 
cultural identity of the United States by sorting people and their preferences. 
But to develop and make adequate use of the de facto integrated system 
that has emerged, we must abandon the federal exclusivity principle—which 
is not constitutionally required in any case. This reformulation would not 
authorize states and localities to adopt measures inconsistent with generally 
applicable law, but it would restrain courts, as well as the federal govern-
ment and the states, from preempting efforts by lower levels of government 
to manage the convergence of the global and the local that today’s immigra-
tion represents. This move would also harness the possibilities for federal-
state-local cooperation in immigration regulation.  
To emphasize the roles being played by states and localities is not to 
suggest that national sovereignty is a mirage, that national citizenship is no 
longer relevant,307 or that the national is disappearing in the face of the 
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global. Rather, global forces, as exemplified by the migration of people 
across borders, are putting pressure on the national in ways that require mul-
tiple forms of disaggregated decision making. The center of gravity in the 
immigration context has shifted, revealing that the level of government we 
might choose to deal with certain issues is historically and politically con-
tingent. It is time we adapt to the contingencies of today and rethink 
immigration federalism. 
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